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   After the corporate collapses in recent years, the protection of equity investors has 
been perceived as a top priority all over the world and has inspired, from 2002 to 
2004, a global reform process which has been speeding up the move towards the 
increasing setting of corporate governance standards at an international level. 
Whereas in 2002, in the USA, the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act aimed at 
increasing the effectiveness of the institutional controls, of strengthening the 
disclosure requirements and the managerial accountability and at preventing the 
situations of conflicts of interest which had been revealed in the corporate scandals, as 
regards the European Community (EC), which had already been harmonising Member 
States securities and financial services laws, in 2003 the Commission published its 
landmark “Action Plan on Company Law and Corporate Governance” (APCLCG)1 to 
set out the initiatives that were regarded as necessary to ensure business efficiency 
and competitiveness together with investors protection, which initiatives have been 
implemented to a good extent over the last four years. Lastly, in 2004 the OECD 
published a revised version of its Principles of Corporate Governance, first issued in 
1999 and which aim at serving as a point of reference for policy makers in the 
development of the legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance. The 
OECD Principles indicate the legal issues relating to the protection of equity investors 
which, to a greater or minor extent, are common to any jurisdictions, and suggest the 
mechanisms to overcome these problems, in light of the ultimate concern which, in 
essence, they identify in the long-term success of the corporations and in their 
contribution to sustainable economic development.  
     In this overall context,  this paper – after summarising in particular the direct legal 
mechanisms which, in the US and in three major EC jurisdictions (France, Germany 
and the UK) are generally intended to protect equity investors, and especially 
minority and non-controlling shareholders – aims at assessing how far these 
mechanisms, and the process of convergence which has also been fostered by EC law 
and which can be expected to continue, can go in ensuring the overall protection of 
(these) investors.  For this purpose, the paper is structured in four parts. Part I 
proposes to explicit a universally applicable concept of equity investors protection 
from the OECD Principles, and evidences that the aspects of this protection relating to 
transparency and disclosure, which have consistently been recognised to US law, have 
also attracted prominent attention at EC level. Part 2  summarises the legal context, in 
the US and in the three EC jurisdictions, with regard to the key rights directly 
recognised to shareholders and to the legal arrangements and developments that, 
indirectly, contribute to shareholders’ protection. Part 3 places this comparative view 
in the context of the functional convergence which is being promoted by the OECD 
and pursued by the EC, and Part 4, in conclusion, attempts to assess how far the legal 
responses to the need of (minority) shareholders protection have gone. In so doing, 
the paper argues that, whereas in some areas concerning (in addition to disclosure and 
transparency) the key share ownership functions and protection of minority 
shareholders against management and controlling shareholders the mechanisms in 
place have gone to a good extent in the right direction, the legal responses which 
                                                 
1 Communication COM 284 (2003) “Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the EU”(hereinafter: APCLCG) 
emerge from an inter-jurisdictional comparison concerning what are generally 
intended as protections mechanisms still appear to miss an important dimension, 
which emerges from the Principles and which can give rise to a challenge for  
legislators and for future academic research.      
 
1. The protection of equity investors in the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance: a twofold dimension. 
 
      Whereas the 1999 version of the OECD Principles only used to indicate the 
common elements underlying good corporate governance, were built on these 
elements and stated their objective of being a “point of reference”, the 2004 version 
not only indicates the elements of good corporate governance, but presents these as 
the minimal means to achieve common objectives. In other words, the “point of 
reference” appears to have shifted from the common elements on their own to the 
common objectives to be achieved in six areas: ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework; the rights of shareholders and key ownership 
functions; the equitable treatment of shareholders; the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance; disclosure and transparency; the responsibilities of the board.     
     In turn, these common objectives can be understood in light of the ultimate 
common criteria, which should inspire legislators and which is stated by the first 
principle newly introduced in the 2004 version. This principle, ‘ensuring the basis for 
an effective corporate governance framework’,  states inter alia that “the corporate 
governance framework should be developed with a view to its impact on overall 
economic performance, market integrity and incentives it creates for market 
participants and the promotion of transparent and efficient markets”2. It requires 
policy makers to focus on the ultimate economic outcomes, and the Methodology for 
the assessment of the implementation of the Principles (2006) specifies that this 
means that policy makers should in essence ensure that the benefits of certain policy 
options outweigh the costs3. This outcome can be assumed to be achieved to a higher 
extent, the higher the extent to which certain policy options in shaping the corporate 
governance framework help ensuring the “long-term success” of corporations4, in 
terms of profitability and competitiveness, as well as the transparency and efficiency 
of markets in which corporations operate and which thus contribute to the long-term 
success. From this perspective, the reason why corporate governance arrangements 
must be credible, well understood across borders and adhere to internationally 
accepted principles lie in the need “to reap the full benefits of the global capital 
market, and..to attract long-term “patient capital”5.  
  Moreover, a reference to the long-term success can be found in the Principles’ 
section concerning the ‘role of stakeholders in corporate governance’, where it is 
stated that ‘the corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders….and encourage active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises’6. In this context, the Annotations explain that ‘Corporate governance is 
also concerned with finding ways to encourage the various stakeholders in the firm to 
undertake economically optimal levels of investment in firm-specific human and 
                                                 
2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, 17. 
3 Methodology for the assessment of OECD Principles, 2006, 14. 
4 Referred to in the Preamble to the Principles, p. 12.  
5 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, 13.   
6 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, p. 20. 
physical capital. The competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the 
result of teamwork that embodies contributions from a range of different resource 
providers including investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers. Corporations 
should recognise that the contributions of stakeholders constitute a valuable resource 
for building competitive and profitable companies. It is, therefore, in the long-term 
interest of the corporation to foster wealth-creating co-operation among stakeholders. 
The governance framework should recognise that the interests of the corporation are 
served by recognising the interests of stakeholders and their contribution to the long-
term success of the corporation’7.   
     Arguably, a first dimension which emerges from the OECD Principles as regards 
the protection of equity investors in corporations can thus be described as the 
“objective aspect” of this protection: the objective conditions for the long-term 
success of the corporation, which lie on the one hand in the transparency and 
efficiency of markets which can allow corporations to collect equity capital, and, on 
the other hand, in the cooperation between the corporations and the stakeholders.  
As regards the first of these conditions, whereas the US market has long been 
regarded as the most transparent and efficient one and the search, by non-US firms, of 
listing on US exchanges has been driven by the facilitation of access to US capital 
market allowed by such listing and by a goal of credibly signalling to investors 
worldwide a commitment to voluntary compliance with stringent US accounting and 
disclosure standards8, the promotion of transparent and efficient markets has also 
been the focus of the EC’s harmonisation efforts in the area of disclosure and capital 
market law. It appears sufficient to remind:  Directive 2001/34/EC, on the admission 
of securities to official stock exchange listing and on information to be published on 
those securities, which aimed at harmonising the information that issuers have to 
disclose to the market9; Directive 2003/6/EC (the “Market Abuse Directive”)10, on 
insider dealing and market manipulation, and the implementing provisions defining 
details thereof11, which introduced detailed provisions to detect and prevent situations 
of insider dealing and market manipulation; Directive 2003/58 EC (“Disclosure 
Directive”),  on disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies12, 
namely on public and other limited liability companies, which aimed at increasing the 
disclosure of accounting documents in paper and electronic form;  Directive 
2003/71/EC (“Prospectus Directive”), on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading13,  and the implementing 
                                                 
7 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, Annotations, p. 46 
8 G. Hertig, Convergence of substantive law and convergence of enforcement: a comparison, in 
J.N.Gordon and M.J.Roe (eds), Convergence and persistence in corporate governance, 2004, Ch. 10, p. 
334. 
9 Directive 2001/34/EC of 28 May 2001, as amended by Directive 2005/1/EC   
10 Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003, in OJ 2003 L 096/16 
11 Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 implementing the Market Abuse Directive as 
regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on 
commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification of managers’ transactions and the 
notification of suspicious transaction; Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 
implementing the Market Abuse Directive as regards the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest; Commission Regulation (EC) 2273/2003 
of 22 December 2003 implementing the Market Abuse Directive as regards exemptions for buy-back 
programmes and stabilisation of financial instruments.    
12 Directive 2003/58/EC of 15 July 2003, in OJ 2003 L 221/13 
13 Directive 2003/71/EC of 4 November 2003, in OJ 2003 L 345/64 and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC. 
Commission Regulation14, which aimed at facilitating access to capital within the EC, 
as well as increased transparency and market integrity, and, by harmonising the 
necessary disclosure requirements, created an effective “single passport” for both EC 
and extra-EC issuers; Directive 2004/109/EC (“Transparency Directive”), on the 
requirement for information provided about issuers whose securities are admitted for 
trading on a regulated market15, supplemented by a recent implementing Commission 
Directive16, which established the general principles for the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in respect of the holding of voting rights or financial 
instruments that entitle to acquire existing shares with voting rights.            
       The Principles also indicate the protection of equity investors in the protection of 
this category from wrong behaviour on behalf of directors, and in the protection of 
weaker investors against abuse by stronger investors. This aspect, which can be 
indicated as a “subjective aspect” of investors protection, underpins numerous 
recommendations formulated by the Principles with regard to: the exercise of 
ownership rights by all shareholders; the equitable treatment of all shareholders; 
disclosure and transparency. In these areas, the Principles recommend the disclosure 
by institutional investors, the availability to all shareholders of effective remedies for 
violations of their rights, the prohibition of insider dealing and abusive self-dealings, 
the protection of minority shareholders from abusive actions by or in the interest of 
controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly. The Annotations to the 
principle clarify that ‘the potential for abuse is marked where the legal system allows, 
and the market accepts, controlling shareholders to exercise a level of control which 
does not correspond to the level of risk that they assume as owners through exploiting 
legal devices….such as pyramid structures or multiple voting rights.  Such abuse may 
be carried out in various ways, including the extraction of direct private benefits….In 
addition to disclosure, a key to protecting minority shareholders is a clearly 
articulated duty of loyalty by board members to the company and to all 
shareholders’17. As mentioned above, the disclosure area, and the prevention of 
insider dealing, has been the focus of EC’s efforts intended to promote the 
transparency and efficiency of markets, but aspects of company law such as the 
admissibility of multiple voting rights or directors’ duties have remained, to date, 
within the competence of national legislators.         
       If the two aspects concerning the protection of equity investors are considered 
together, it may be realised that, in case of minority, non-controlling shareholders – as 
well as of individual savers investing in the stock market -  both the objective aspect 
(the conditions for companies’ continuing success over time) and the subjective 
aspect (the protection from abuse by strong investors) applies, whereas, in the case of 
controlling shareholders or institutional investors, which may be broadly characterised 
as strong investors,  only the objective aspect (conditions for companies’ continuing 
success over time) would apply.  
     On the other hand, having regard to the ownership structures in the world-wide 
scenario, ownership concentration appears in a sense to be a common feature: 
whereas continental Europe and much of the world has long been characterised by 
controlling shareholders, even in the US and the UK, which have been traditionally 
characterised by dispersed shareholding and control in the hands of management, 
                                                 
14 Commission Regulation implementing the Prospectus Directive (29.04.2004), OJ L 2004 215/3 
(“Prospectus Regulation”).   
15 Directive 2004/109/EC of 15 December 2004, in OJ 2004 L 390/38 
16 Commission Directive 2007/14/EC of 8 March 2007, in OJ 2007 L 69/27.  
17 OECD Principles, 2004, Annotations, p. 42 
ownership of publicly traded companies tends to be increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of institutional investors (such as pensions funds, life insurance companies, unit 
trusts, investment trusts)18 .  
     Therefore,  this twofold taxonomy – i.e., the categories “weaker investors” (non-
controlling shareholders) vs. “stronger investors”, and “objective aspect” vs. 
“subjective aspect” -  can be applied to all jurisdictions, as the category of  non-
controlling  shareholders may be read as including  minority shareholders in 
continental Europe and non-institutional, i.e. individual shareholders in the US and 
the UK.     
 
2. The protection of equity investors in some jurisdictions: a comparative view 
   
    The protection of equity investors has been the subject of several contributions in 
the international literature, where the legal issue of common interest have attracted 
much attention, in particular after the corporate collapses in the US and in the EU in 
the last few years. Prior to the collapses, a milestone work in the literature had already 
construed an ‘investor protection index’, based on a pre-defined set of shareholders’ 
rights – specifically, proxy by mail; the block of shares before shareholders’ 
meetings; cumulative voting or proportional representation; judicial avenues to 
challenge decisions of either management or the assembly, or the right to require the 
company to purchase their shares; pre-emptive rights, i.e. the right to buy new issues 
of stock;  right of shareholders holding a certain percentage of the share capital to call 
on extraordinary meeting – and had found that common law countries perform better 
than civil law countries19. Nevertheless, this index and the related findings have been 
widely criticised by the subsequent literature, which has pointed out the ability of 
different legal systems to achieve comparable outcomes in terms of investors’ 
protection by using different instruments20, the omission in the construction of the 
index of fundamental elements relating to corporate law on the whole, which elements 
have been considered in constructing a new shareholder protection index21, and the 
importance of the allocation of power in corporations22.  
    This literature appears to focus on one of the legal issues, concerning the protection 
of investors, which are identified by the OECD Principles and which are common to 
all jurisdictions: the protection of minority shareholders against either managers or 
dominant shareholders.  The attribution of legal rights to minority shareholders as a 
sub-group of the “weak investors” category, and the attribution of remedies to 
individual shareholders, can be seen as the direct protection mechanisms, which, 
however, can be used – and thus need to be considered - in the broader context of the 
conditions concerning companies’ management and its outcomes. These conditions, 
which can thus be regarded as the indirect protection of minority shareholders and 
other equity investors, include, together with disclosure and transparency, the rules 
governing conflicts of interests, directors’ duties and accountability and, in general, 
                                                 
18 J. Solomon, A. Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, 2004, p. 91. 
19 R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes,  A. Sheifer, and R. Vishny,  Law and Finance, 106 J.POL.ECON. 
1113 (1998)  
20 E.g.: U.C. Braendle, Shareholder protection in the USA and Germany: - “Law and Finance” 
Revisited, 2006 German Law Journal 257   
21 P.P.Lele, M.M.Siems, Shareholder protection, A Leximetric Approach, 2007 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies  17  
22 S. Cool, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers, 2005 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 697   
the overall “corporate objective”, i.e. the ultimate purpose of company’s management 
activity.      
   Because all these conditions, together with the direct protection mechanisms,  
reflect the recommendations formulated by the OECD, they can be assumed as a base 
for the inter-jurisdictional comparison. Within the European Community, part of the 
OECD recommendations which are intended to remove barriers to shareholders’ 
involvement have also been implicitly accepted by the new Directive 2007/3623, on 
shareholders rights in listed companies (hereinafter: Shareholders Rights Directive), 
which has been introduced as part of the implementation of the APCLCG and which 
indicates some of the direct protection mechanisms that must be adopted by Member 




2.1.  Shareholders’ protection in the US (summary)…  
 
   With regard to the US, the jurisdiction which best performed according to the 
proponents of the first “investor-protection index” elaborated by the literature24, the 
scenario has been characterised by the “legal competition” between the different 
States for attracting the incorporation of companies within their jurisdictions, and the 
Delaware corporate law has emerged as the most influent and successful regime. 
Accordingly, the literature on comparative corporate governance and shareholder 
protection, when examining the US legal environment, refers mainly to the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (DGCL), to the Securities Act of 1933 (SA 1933), to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA 1934), to the Rules of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission based on the SEA 1934 (SEC Rules) to the 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act), to the Listed 
Companies Manual of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE Manual) and to the  
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), which is an elaboration of the Committee 
on  Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association, 
initiaaly issued in 1984 and amended several time. These sources are assumed as a 
reference point in the present summary too. The key features of the US corporate and 
securities law environment which affect shareholders’ protection can be systematised 
as follows: 
     
a) Shareholders’ meetings competences and the position of minority shareholders   
 
 
     US corporate laws does not leave shareholders the final say on the issues – such as 
dividend payments, share buy-back – that typically fall within the competence of 
shareholders’ meeting in Europe, but empowers directors to make all decisions or 
confer directors an exclusive power to make all decisions if a shareholder vote is 
mandated. The common law principle that the board holds the primary management 
power is well embodied in the DGCL, which stipulates that “..the business and affairs 
of every corporation…shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors” except as may be otherwise provided by the law or the certificate of 
incorporation. In the US, shareholders’ meeting substantive powers have traditionally 
                                                 
23 Directive 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed 
companies, in OJEU L 184 of 14 July 2007, pp. 17-24 
24 R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes,  A. Sheifer, and R. Vishny,  Law and Finance, cit.  
been limited to the election of directors and approval of charter or bylaw amendments, 
mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets, and voluntary 
dissolution, but the NYSE and the Nasdaq amended their listing rules in 2003 by 
requiring shareholders approval of shares-based compensation plans and by 
prohibiting brokers from voting their clients’ shares to approve these compensation 
plans, unless the clients instruct the brokers on how to vote.  Shareholders’ meetings 
decisions - unlike the typical rules, in European countries, of special majorities for 
decisions such as mergers or changes in bylaws or articles, which requirements are 
intended, indirectly, to protect minority shareholders -  in the US never require a vote 
different from a simple majority. Minority shareholders have thus to accept majority’s 
decisions without possibilities to indirectly affect them, and their possibility of 
influencing the general meeting’s agenda is also strongly limited, for two reasons.  
     First,  although they can add an item to the meeting agenda, the effectiveness of 
this mechanism is strongly reduced. The right to add an item is subject to conditions 
concerning not only the eligibility, but also the deadline for its exercise, the space 
limits and the management’s right to exclude the proposal from the notice calling the 
meeting. The eligibility is recognised to shareholders which represent a percentage of 
1% of the share capital, increased to 10% for proposals for director election filling 
vacancies in the board, and an absolute threshold of 2.000,00 $ in terms of fair market 
value. Despite the low threshold (except for directors election),  shareholders must, as 
a further eligibility requirement, have held shares for 1 year before the proposal. As 
regards the deadline for the exercise of the right, shareholders must deliver their 
proposal more than 5 months before the meeting (120 calendar days before 
company’s proxy statement is released), and the proposal, including the 
accompanying supporting statement, must not exceed 500 words in length. The US 
proxy rules allow management to refuse to circulate the proposal for 5 reasons: a) the 
proposal relates to a specific amount of dividend; b) the proposal is regarded as not 
relevant, which is the case when it relates to operations which account for less than 
5% of the company’s total assets at the end of the most recent fiscal year, and for less 
than 5% of the company’s net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, 
and it is not otherwise significantly related to the company’s business; c) the proposal 
relates to more than one item per voting right holder for a particular shareholders’ 
meetings; d) the proposal conflicts with one of the management’s own proposals to be 
presented to shareholders at the same meeting; e) the proposal relates to director 
election. In addition, shareholders have no express right to counter-motion, i.e. to alter 
a proposal already formulated by the management. 
     Second,  in Delaware shareholders do not have a right to call an extraordinary 
general meetings: the DGCL grants the statutory powers to call the extraordinary 
general meeting only to the board of directors and to “other persons” authorized by 
the company’s charter or by- laws, which can thus prevent shareholders from calling 
up the meeting. The majority of other states, and the revised MBCA, allow 
shareholders representing 10% of the capital to call the extraordinary general meeting, 
but, under the revised MBCA, the threshold may be increased up to 25%.  
    Nonetheless, two counterbalancing elements exist for minority shareholders 
protection. First, the traditional directors’ obligation to promote the interest of 
shareholders, i.e. to maximise shareholders’ profit in order to safeguard their 
investment  and attract new capital 25, relates also to minority shareholders26. Second, 
                                                 
25 Cox, Hazen, Corporations, 2nd ed., 2003, par. 4.10.  
26 Hansmann, Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,  2001 Georgetown Law Journal 439 
courts have made it clear that majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty of good faith 
and fair dealing to minority shareholders27 and, in this respect, a doctrine of minority 
oppression has been developed by the case law. This doctrine, which was initially 
developed by courts in the ambit of shareholders’ primacy and of the related 
directors’ fiduciary duty to all shareholders28,  relies on notions of fairness and 
implies equal treatment of all shareholders: minority oppression has been described 
by courts, in the most common formulations, as “burdensome, harsh and wrongful 
conduct..a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair 
play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to 
rely”, or as violations of the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing majority 
shareholders owe minority shareholders, or to frustration of the reasonable 
expectations of the shareholders29.       
       
 
b) Individual shareholders’ rights 
 
      Individual shareholders have generally the right to vote by proxy, to cumulative 
vote, to inspection, and to apply for a court order to call the annual general meeting in 
particular circumstances;  they can also freely  transfer their shares before the general 
meeting. Lastly, different options exist for pre-emptive rights in the various States, 
and, in case of “exit” at the occasion of specific operations, dissident shareholders 
finds themselves in a different position according to the situation at stake.  
      The right to proxy voting is largely used, but, from the perspective of shareholder 
protection, it appears to be an important tool only in companies subject to the SEC 
rules, which require that the proxy offers the shareholders the possibility to approve, 
to disapprove or to abstain on each particular matter. In the other companies, the 
board, when sending out notices of a shareholders’ meeting, usually includes a blank 
proxy form soliciting shareholder’ signature and providing postage at the company’s 
expense; these proxies are exercised by a proxy committee appointed by the board or 
the management and which is expected to express a positive vote. Minority 
shareholders are free to engage in proxy solicitation, provided such solicitation 
follows (in addition to US securities laws and procedures) any procedures established 
in the company’s charter and/or bylaws. Proxy solicitation is used, in particular, in the 
election of directors deemed to replace current management, as a mechanism of ex 
ante control which is known as “proxy fight”30 and which usually involves the search, 
by a shareholder group nominating its own slate of directors, of the votes of other 
shareholders. The SEA 1934 allows a public company either to provide a shareholder 
lists to shareholders wishing to solicit proxies or to send them the soliciting materials. 
Under the DGCL, shareholder list, containing information on names and addresses of 
other shareholders, can be obtained by shareholders wishing to receiving it upon 
demand, which demands need to be under oath, to state the purpose and to declare 
their status as shareholders accompanied by documentary evidence. On the other 
hand, proxy rules issued by the SEC under the SEA 1934 establish the obligation to 
                                                 
27 Cox, Hazen, cit., par. 11.11   
28 D.G. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 1998 The Journal of Corporation Law 277, p. 305 et 
sq.  
29 R.B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 1993 Business Law 699, D.G. 
Smith, cit. at 321.  
30 A.v.Aaken, Shareholders Suits as a Technique of Internalisation and control of management, 2004 
RabelsZ, .  
provide shareholders which a proxy statement which requires full disclosure regarding 
the vote. 
   In board elections, shareholders can often use cumulative voting, which allows them 
to cast all their votes for one candidate and is based on the idea of ensuring a 
representative of minority shareholders in the board. This shareholders’ right is 
mandatory in 9 States, whereas in several States – including Delaware - it applies if 
not excluded in the company’s articles of association (opt-out choice) and in other 
States it is allowed only if expressly provided for by the articles (opt-in choice).  
The right to vote is determined with respect to the shares held by that shareholder on a 
specified date prior to the general meeting, known as record date. This is established 
by the board of directors, who can only set it at some point no more than 60 days and 
no less than 10 days before the meeting; in case of failure by the board to fix the 
record date, this is automatically at the close of the business on the day next preceding 
the day when the notice of the meeting is given, or, in case of waiver of notice, on the 
day next preceding the day of the meeting. 
   With a view to a proper use of their voting right and, in general, to monitor 
corporate affairs, shareholders are granted the right to inspection by both state laws 
and federal securities law. This covers the lists of shareholders, share registers, stock 
or transfer books, the minutes of corporate proceedings, the accounts and other 
financial records, the proxies held and ballots cast in board elections and proxy 
statements. 
   In addition to the right to vote, to use/solicit proxies and to inspect documents, 
shareholders’ rights in relation to the general meeting include the right to have the 
annual general meeting itself convened; DGCL allows any shareholder to apply for a 
court order to call the annual general meeting if directors fail to duly convene it or if 
there are no directors in office. 
   Shares can be freely transferred before the shareholder meeting; the lack of a 
deposit obligation reflects the fact that, since 1991, US corporations only offer 
registered shares. If shares are sold after the record date, the buyer can compel the 
seller to grant him proxies to vote for the transferred shares.          
   Under DGCL, as well as under the revised MBCA, pre-emptive rights, allowing 
shareholders to keep their holding unaffected, must be expressly provided for by the 
articles of incorporation. Some other States, like New York take the opposite 
approach, by providing for pre-emptive rights but allowing the articles of 
incorporation to exclude these rights.    
   Lastly, in cases of mergers, charter amendments, sale of all assets the dissident 
shareholder, wishing to sell its shares, finds itself in a different position according to 
the event which triggers its decision to recede from the company. In cases of mergers, 
the shareholder enjoys an “appraisal right”, i.e. a right to receive a fair price, but, in 
principle, this does not apply in listed companies. In case or charter amendments or 
sale of all assets, the appraisal right exists only if provided for in the company’s 
charter. In case of takeover, there is no mandatory bid and thus no “exit right” at fair 
price for minorities.     
 
c) directors’ duties 
     
   Directors, which are regarded as fiduciaries of the corporation, owe a  duty of 
loyalty and a duty of care. The duty of loyalty requires directors to protect the best 
interest of the company, and not pursue their own interest over those of the company 
and its shareholders; it is intended to cover a very wide range of possible situations, 
amongst which self-dealing transactions between the manager and the firm when, by 
buying at a too low or selling at a too high price, the manager as a controlling party 
may transfer wealth from the company to himself. This is the crucial conflict of 
interest situation, which state corporations law aim at preventing. Most state 
corporations law define the issue as involving “a transaction between a corporation 
and one or more of its directors or officers…..or an organisation in which one or more 
of its directors or officers are directors or officers, or have a financial interest” and 
require that such transactions either be “fair to the corporation” or be approved, after 
full disclosure, by a majority of the disinterested directors or shareholders31.  
The recent reforms, in an attempt to curb self-dealings, have required that companies 
have a compensation committee entirely composed of independent directors, and have 
forbidden corporate loans to directors.  
     The duty of care requires directors to act “with such care, including reasonable 
inquiry, as an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances”; it is thus expressed as a standard of desired conduct in terms of 
reasonably or ordinary diligence, knowledge and skills. In the use of this standard, all 
States apply what is known as “the business judgment rule”. This rule, which has been 
specifically defined by the Delaware Supreme Court,  “is a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of 
the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the 
courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting 
the presumption”32.  As a result of this rule, the liability standard is transformed into a 
gross negligence test33. This makes it very unlikely that board decisions result in 
personal director liability for a violation of the duty of care, and, even if a director 
were found liable for breach of the duty of care, with no element of improper personal 
gain from self-dealing, the judgement will generally by covered by an insurance paid 
by the company34. The business judgment rule, however, does not offer directors 
protection for breach of the duty of loyalty.     
 
d) Disclosure and directors’ independence requirements  
 
            
    The mandatory disclosure requirements, has been increasingly strengthened over 
time. The contents of the disclosure regimes currently in force are as follows. The 
SEA 1933 requires, for public offerings of securities in the US, the filing of a 
registration statement with the SEC and the dissemination of a prospectus containing 
extensive information about the business and financial history of the issuer. On 
becoming a public company, an issuer must also meet comparable disclosure 
requirements in mandatory periodic reports that are filed with the SEC and sent to 
shareholders, and whose contents are specified in detail in SEC rules. The financial 
statements must be presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP which have been 
established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and must be 
                                                 
31 T.Baums, K.E.Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously ? Corporate Governance in the United 
States and Germany, ECGI Law Working Paper n. 17/2003.  
 
32 Aronson v.Lewls, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.. 1984). 
33 Smith v. Van Gorkorn, 488 A.2nd 858 (Del. 1985).  
34 T.Baums, K.E.Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously ? Corporate Governance in the United 
States and Germany, cit.   
audited by an independent public accountant in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards (GAAS); moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has increased the 
content of each annual and quarterly financial report, by requiring the disclosure of all 
material off-balance sheet transactions and other relationships with unconsolidated 
entities that may have a material current or future effects on the issuers’ financial 
conditions. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has charged a newly created body, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), with the responsibility of setting 
the audit standards, and has introduced one further requirement which is intended the 
guarantee the reliability of the financial information disclosed by the company, 
namely the certification, by the company’s CEO and CFO, that the financial 
statements fairly present the operations and financial conditions of the company;  
criminal penalties are imposed for knowingly false certifications. Both the 
establishment of GAAP and the setting of audit standards are subject to review and 
final determination by the SEC.  
   In relation to private purchases, and purchases and sales of shares in the secondary 
market, the SEC proscribes any material misstatement or omission made with 
knowledge by a party involved in a security transaction; as a result, unless there has 
been complete and proper disclosure, insiders (including the company) may not trade.  
   The  reforms introduced by the Congress, the NYSE and the Nasdaq in the wake of 
the corporate collapses have required that: a majority of directors be independent, 
where the independence requirements have been tightened; audit committees, whose 
powers and responsibilities have been extended, be entirely composed by independent 
directors;  adequate internal control mechanisms exist within companies. 
   In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has not only increased the responsibilities of 
directors in relation to disclosure, but also strengthened their responsibility 
concerning the internal control system and the prevention of conflicts of interest 
situations. As regards these aspects, the key provision set: the obligation on 
management to assess the internal controls and disclose its findings in an “internal 
control report” to be reviewed by auditors; the prohibition for any officer or director 
of a public company to take actions to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate or 
mislead any auditor; the obligation on the CEO and CFO, in case the company is 
required to prepare a restatement due to material non-compliance with financial 
reporting requirement, to reimburse the company for any bonus or other incentive-
based or equity-based compensation received during the 12 months following the 
issuance of non-compliance documents and for any profits realised through the sale of 
company’s securities during such period; the prohibition for officers and directors to 
buy and sell shares during blackout periods when employees sales and purchases are 
restricted, and the company’s empowerment to recover any profit resulting from such 
sales from the offending party; the prohibition for public companies to extend credit 
to directors or executive officers.   
  
e) Enforcement  
 
    Direct actions either to set aside the validity of resolutions adopted by the 
shareholders’ meeting or against directors, and action by or on behalf of the 
corporation, known as “derivative suits”, are possible. Any shareholder can institute 
the first category of action when he has suffered a damage that was not inflicted on  
other shareholders, by individually suing corporate directors or by seeking redress e.g. 
from majority shareholders.    
    Derivative suits – which can be initiated when a damage has been caused to the 
corporation or to all shareholders in proportion to their holding – are generally based 
on a breach of directors’ fiduciary duty, and, in particular, of the duty of loyalty. 
Shareholders must, however, pass several procedural steps before the court considers 
the substance of the derivative claim: standing requirements; demand requirements; 
lastly, after the proceedings have begun, the review by a special litigation committee 
of disinterested shareholders. Standing requirements refers to the absence of conflicts 
and to the quality of shareholders interests, and do not use raise problems. 
Nevertheless, demand requirements can be real impediment:  the shareholder – unless 
demand is excused – must require that the board initiate the suit, so that, in case of 
refusal by the board, if the refusal passes a business judgment review the shareholders 
is prevented from bringing the derivative claim. The demand requirement does not 
exist, and the shareholder can bring the suit himself, where the demand would be 
“futile”, which is the case when reasonable doubt exists that: 1) the directors are 
disinterested and independent, or 2) the challenged operation was otherwise the 
product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Even after the proceeding is 
initiated, and the court has determined that either demand is excused or the refusal by 
the board to bring the claim after demand was made is illegitimate, the special 
litigation committee may still stop the action. The court may accept this decision if 
the committee is independent and recommends in good faith that proceedings be 
dismissed. Despite these requirements,  the use of derivative suits is encouraged by 
the fact that fostered as lawyers can agree on contingency fees, and thus can expect 
considerable gains if successful, and due to favourable costs provisions, which, for the 
litigant shareholder, reduce the risk of unexpectedly high costs. In fact, each party 
pays their own lawyers’ costs, irrespective of the outcome of the proceeding, and the 
shareholder concerned can often claim reimbursement against his own company.      
     As regards the procedural question of how a claim can be brought, the US offer 
what is perhaps its most well-known enforcement mechanism, i.e. the efficient class 
action. A candidate “class” representative takes the initiative, by filing and action and 
asking the court to “certify the class” i.e. to state that the party’s claim are 
representative of that of the class (of shareholders who have suffered the damage) as a 
whole. Under DGCL, and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are 
several prerequisites. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a shareholder 
may sue as representative party on behalf of all if: the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all its members is not practicable; there are question or law or fact common 
to the class; the claim of the representative party are typical of the claim of the class; 
the representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
The DGCL also state he must demonstrate that separate actions would imply a risk of 
inconsistency, or that the party who opposes has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, or that the question of law or fact common to the 
members of the class is prominent over any question affecting only individual 
member, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy. If the court agrees, it orders notice to be sent 
to the members of the class: shareholders who have not taken the initiative are invited 
to join.   Notoriously, the class action mechanism is a popular one, and their use is 
encouraged by the possibility for lawyers to share in the proceeds through 
contingency fees, together with the rewarding of well grounded claims.   
   Class action are also available to enforce private rights of actions created for 
investors by the SEA 1933, as regards the case of material mis-understatement or 
omission in a registration statement or prospectus. The rights of action are available to 
purchasers against issuers, on the basis of strict liability, and against top management 
and directors, on a negligence basis; the enforcement intended to guarantee the 
effectiveness of mandatory disclosure is ensured not only by securities plaintiff bar, 
i.e. by the lawyer who bring the class action proceedings on behalf of a large number 
of investors, but also by the possibility of public enforcement by the SEC and the US 
Department of Justice.         
   
    
   
2.2. …….and in three major EC jurisdictions   
 
 
2.2.1. Protection of minority shareholders vs. controlling shareholders: the direct 
protection mechanisms…. 
 
    After the  Directives intended to foster the transparency and efficiency of markets, 
the EC  legislator, by means of the new Shareholders’ Rights Directive, intends to 
facilitate and encourage effective shareholders involvement, by prescribing minimum 
standards for a series of direct protection mechanisms.    
   In particular, the Shareholders Rights Directive provides for:  
a) the equal treatment of shareholders who are in the same position with regard 
to participation and the exercise of voting rights in the general meeting;  
b) the convocation of the general meeting, on the one hand, in a manner ensuring 
both fast access to it on a non-discriminatory basis and effective dissemination 
of information to the public throughout the Community, and, on the other 
hand, with a timeframe and content such as to allow shareholders to have 
sufficient time to consider all issues and to cast informed votes at or in 
advance of the general meeting;  
c) the availability of all information necessary for this purpose in the Internet site 
of listed companies;  
d) the rights for shareholders acting either individually or collectively to put 
items on the agenda of the general meeting, provided that each such item is 
accompanied by a justification or a draft resolution to be adopted by the 
meeting, and to table draft resolutions, which rights must not be subject to 
shareholding thresholds exceeding 5% of the company’s share capital;  
e) the right to ask questions related to items on the general meeting agenda and to 
have them answered;  
f) the requirements for participation and vote in the general meeting, 
specifically: the absence of  requirements to deposit the shares with, transfer 
them to, or register them in the name of another natural or legal person before 
the general meeting; an obligation on Member States to provide that the right 
of participation in the general meeting and of vote be determined with respect 
to a record date, which record date must not lie more than 30 days before the 
date of the general meeting to which it applies; a further Member States’ 
obligation to ensure that at least 8 days elapse between the latest permissible 
date for the convocation of the general meeting and the record date; the 
absence of restrictions to the transfer of shares during the period between the 
record date determined by Member States and the general meeting;  
g) the participation in the general meeting by electronic means;  
h) the right of every shareholder to appoint any other natural or legal person as a 
proxy holder to attend and vote at a general meeting in his name, and the 
abolition by Member States of any provision which restricts, or allows 
companies to restrict, the eligibility of persons to be appointed as proxy 
holders;  
i) the prohibition, for Member States, to restrict or allow companies to restrict 
the exercise of shareholders rights through proxy holders for any purpose 
other than to address potential conflicts of interest between the proxy holder 
and the appointing shareholder;  
j) the obligation for Member States to enable persons who hold proxies from 
several shareholders to cast votes for a certain shareholder differently from 
votes cast for another shareholder, to permit the appointment of proxy holders, 
the acceptance by companies of the notification of the appointment and the 
revocation of the appointment by electronic means and only in writing;  
k) the obligation for Member States to permit companies to allow their 
shareholders to vote by correspondence in advance of the general meeting;  
l) the facilitation of the effective exercise of voting rights by investors through 
financial intermediaries and, for this purpose, the obligation on Member States 
not to impose on these intermediaries disclosure requirements going beyond 
the identification of each of their clients investor, and to permit financial 
intermediaries to cast votes attaching to some of the shares differently from 
votes attaching to the other shares;  
m) the determination, for each resolution, of the voting result through methods 
that reflect the voting intentions expressed by shareholders, and the obligation 
to make voting results transparent, after the general meeting, at least through 
the company’s Internet site within a period not exceeding 15 days after the 
meeting.                
On the whole, the Shareholders Rights Directive has a prescriptive nature in 
establishing the kind of involvement mechanisms that allow each shareholder to voice 
his intentions in the general meeting  (so-called ‘voice mechanisms’), while at the 
same time offering Member States some flexibility in the way of running these 
mechanisms.  The prescriptive nature can be found in provisions intended to protect 
minority shareholders from abuse by controlling shareholders or directors: this is the 
case, e.g., for  the convocation of the general meeting, which must be issued no later 
than 21st day before the day of the meeting, and for the identification of situations of 
potential conflicts of interests between the proxy holders and the appointing 
shareholders, which situations are identified in particular in those cases where the 
proxy holder is a controlling shareholder or an entity controlled by such shareholder, 
or where he is a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of 
the company, or of a controlling shareholder or of an entity controlled by this 
shareholder, or where he is an employee or an auditor of the company or of a 
controlling shareholder or controlled entity or has a family relationship with a person 
who is in one of the previously indicated situations. The flexibility can be found, e.g., 
with regard to: shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting, 
where Member States may provide that this right may be exercised only in relation to 
annual general meeting provided that shareholders have the right to call or to require 
the company to call an extraordinary general meeting with an agenda including at 
least all the items required by those shareholders; participation in the general meeting 
by electronic means, where Member States must permit companies to offer any or all 
amongst the real-time transmission of the general meeting, the real-time two-way 
communication enabling shareholders to address the general meeting from a remote 
location, and a mechanism for casting votes, before or during the general meeting, 
without the need to appoint a proxy holder who is physically present at the meeting; 
proxy voting, where Member States may limit the appointment of a proxy holder to a 
single meeting or to such meetings as may be held during a certain period. This 
flexibility appears thus based on the assumption that a different use of the same 
mechanisms can still allow the same degree of shareholders protection.          
    The Directive must be implemented by Member States by 3 August 200935, and its 
prescriptive provisions, due to their clear and precise formulation, can be expected to 
have “direct effect”, i.e. to directly confer rights to shareholders, if not correctly 
and/or timely implemented.  
    Accordingly, the Directive is deemed, in case of listed companies, to restrict the 
areas where the direct protection mechanisms are still left to the complete discretion 
of Member States. A comparative view of France, Germany and UK provisions36  
shows that – despite the well known differences in the internal organisation structures, 
in respect of which the UK requires a single board composed of executive and non-
executive directors, German law provides for a two-tier board with a supervisory 
board elected by shareholders and a management board elected by the supervisory 
                                                 
35 Art. 15, 1st paragraph; see, however the limited exception granted by the 2nd paragraph which, for a 
specific provisions concerning proxies, allow some Member States to postpone implementation to 3 
August 2012. 
36 The main sources are the French Code of Commerce, the German Stock Corporations Act 
(“Aktiengesetz”, AktG) – both amended  by recent legislation - and the UK new Companies Act 2006, 
which replaces the previous Companies Act 1985, and the case-law. Other important sources for the 
overall legal environment on (minority) shareholder protection are, for France: Décret n. 67-236 sur les 
sociétés commerciales, as amended; Règlement general de l’Authorité des marchés financiers (AMF) 
2004; Code Monétaire et Financier, 2000; Recommendations sur le gouvernement d’entreprise, 
Association Francaise de la gestion financière, 1998 (amended in 2001 and 2004); Principes de 
gouvernement d’entreprise resultant de la consolidation des rapports conjoints de l’AFEP (Associations 
Francaise des Entreprises Privées) ed du MEDEF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France), 2003 
(French Corporate Governance Principles). For Germany: HGB (Commercial Code), MitBestG (Gesetz 
uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer, Law on Co-determination) 1976, BGBI I 1153;  Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesets (Second Financial Market Promotion Act), 1994, BGBI I 1749; Drittes 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesets (Third Financial Market Promotion Act),   1998, BGBI I 529; KonTraG 
(Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich; Corporation Control and 
Transparency Act), 1998, BGBI I 786; NaStraG (Gesetz zur Nomensaktie und zur Erleichterung der 
Stimmrechtsausubung, Law on Registered Shares and Simplification of Voting), 2001, BGBI I 123; 
WpUG (Gesetz zur Regelung von offentlichen Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wertpapieren und von 
Unternehmensubernahmen (WpUG), Take-Over Act), 2001 BGBI I 3822; Viertes 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesets (Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act), 2002 BGBI I 2010; TransPuG 
(Transparency and Disclosure Act), 2002 BGBI I 2861; German Corporate Governance Code, 2002 
(subsequently amended);  UMAG (Gesetz zur Unterhehmensintegritat und Modernisierung des 
Anfrechtungsrecht, Law on the Improvement of Corporate Integrity and on the Modernization of the 
Regime governing Decision-Directed Suits) 2005 BGBI I 2802. For the UK: Insolvency Act 1986; 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000;  City Codes 
on Take-over and Mergers of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers; Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance 2003; Companies (Audit, Investigation & Community Enterprise) Act 2004. The UK has, 
since the early 90s, produced more codes of best practices than other countries (notably the Cadbury 
Code, 1992, applied since 1993; the Greenbury Code, 1995, applied since 1996; the Hampel Code, 
1998, applied since June 1998), before consolidating them in the Combined Code of 2003 (which has 
been, in turn, subject to amendmenys based on Smith Report, Audit Committees Combined Code 
Guidance, 2003; Higgs Report, Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, 2003).      
     
  
  
board, and France leaves individual companies the choice between a single board of 
directors or a dual board structure with a management organ (“directoire”) and a 
supervisory board - all three jurisdiction resort to basically five kinds of direct 
protection mechanisms for weak investors,  i.e. to mechanisms which consist of rights 
to act for the purpose of: a) expressing  minority shareholders’ voice in the general 
meeting, which can be indicated as “voice mechanisms”; b) monitoring the 
management (“monitoring mechanisms”); c) keeping the stockholding in the company 
unaffected by directors or majority decisions, which can be indicative as 
“shareholding defence mechanisms”; d) selling the shareholding at fair prices, which 
can be indicated as “exit mechanisms”; e) obtaining judicial redress, i.e. “enforcement 
mechanisms”. The Shareholders Right Directive leaves to the complete discretion of 
Member States the mechanisms sub c) and e), whereas it provides for minimum 
standards for the voice mechanisms and the monitoring mechanisms; the “exit 
mechanism” sub d) have been affected by another EC Directive, namely the Takeover 
bid Directive (see infra, d).  
 
 
a) voice mechanisms     
 
All three jurisdictions offer the right to have a shareholders meeting called, and the 
right to add an item to the agenda of the general meeting. 
   The right to have a shareholders meeting convened can be exercised by shareholders  
by applying for a court order to call the meeting in case of failure to do so by directors 
or managers when requested by shareholders – which is the case in France and 
Germany - or by forcing directors to convene the meeting if the law requires them to 
call the meeting on shareholder’ request, which is the case in the UK. All three 
jurisdictions establish a threshold share requirements for the exercise of this right and, 
whereas the UK provision which forces directors to call the meeting appears to 
provide for a more efficient mechanism than French and German provisions which 
empower shareholders to demand directors or managers to call the meeting in first 
instance and which entitles them to resort to the court in case of failure by directors or 
managers to do so, the 5% threshold required in France and Germany in lieu of the 
10% threshold required in the UK for public companies makes it easier the initiative 
to minority shareholders of French or German companies than to shareholders of 
these UK public companies.  Moreover, both France and the UK provides for an 
individual calling right in specific circumstances. France empowers any shareholder, 
in case of urgency, to petition the court for the appointment a representative to call the 
general meeting. 
   In the UK, if directors are required to call a meeting by shareholders and fail to do 
so, the shareholders who requested the directors to call the meeting, of any of them 
representing more than 50% of the total voting rights of all these shareholders, may 
themselves call a general meeting, and any reasonable expense incurred by the 
shareholders requesting the meeting must be reimbursed by the company ad retained 
out of any sum due to directors. If for any reason it is impracticable either to call the 
meeting in any manner in which the meetings of the company concerned may be 
called or to conduct the meeting in the manner prescribed by the company’s articles or 
by law, any shareholder can apply to the court for an order to call, hold and conduct 
the meeting in any manner the court thinks fit. 
   The right to add an item to the meeting agenda, in both France and Germany, 
already satisfies the minimum standard required by the Shareholders Rights Directive.  
In fact, in both countries, the threshold requirement already complies with the 
Directive and shareholders can use the right for a twofold purpose. Before the first 
notice of the meeting,  they can take an initiative which will be included in this first 
notice; after the notice convening the meeting, they can use it for a response to 
management notice, and in both cases they do not need to inform management about 
their positions until very shortly – generally taken to mean 7 to 10 days - before the 
meeting.    
   In the UK, although the threshold satisfies the Directive requirement, shareholders 
can find themselves unable to effectively use the right to add an item as a response to 
an agenda issued by directors, due to the required timeliness, if notice of meeting is 
issued less than 6 weeks before the annual general meeting, which has been to date 
the normal case. In this situation, the fact that shareholders’ proposal needs to 
presented no less than 6 weeks before the day of the annual general meeting leaves 
shareholders, if directors informally agree to put the proposed item on the agenda but 
subsequently change their mind before issuing the agenda, without a power of 
response and the only possible option would be to call a meeting themselves. The 
calling right, however, would be subject for public companies to the 10% rather than 
to the 5% threshold. In addition, shareholders of UK companies may not propose 
resolutions to extraordinary general meeting, but, for those meetings, must only rely 
on shareholder statements, which bear limitations (see table below). It appears thus 
doubtful whether the overall situation would be in line with the spirit of the 
Shareholders Rights Directive.    
    France and Germany offer two additional rights which go beyond the Directive in 
empowering minority shareholders. The first is a right to counter motion, which can 
be exercised by shareholders holding 0,5% of the capital in France and by any 
shareholder in Germany; by presenting draft resolutions which amend the 
management proposals, shareholders can directly interact with management in the 
decision making process. In the UK, shareholders reaching a certain thresholds can 
force the company to circulate statements to all other shareholders, which statement 
express their position on a draft resolution and require a positive or negative vote but 
cannot change a management proposals. The second is the right to form Associations 
of Interests empowered to represent their interests within the company. The French 
case of this “inside protection” appears to be the most significant: shareholders 
holding a share capital threshold which is lower the higher the amount of the share 
capital,  after having achieved once the formal status of Association of Interests, are 
considered to meet permanently the required thresholds in all subsequent meetings for 
the exercise of the calling right,  of the right to add an item to the meeting agenda and 
of the right to counter motion. The availability of this mechanism to shareholders who 
have been holding shares for at least 2 years is intended to encourage long-term 
investments, and it significantly reduces shareholders’ coordination costs (as 
shareholders do not need to bear the costs of proving quorum and communicating 
with a multitude of other shareholders every time they exercise their rights). No 
equivalent exists in the UK, where the Shareholders’ Association campaign to protect 
and improve shareholders’ rights but does not offer an “inside” voice within 
companies. The effectiveness of all rights whose exercise is conditional upon reaching 
a specific threshold depends on the easy of reaching the threshold and thus of 
communicating with other shareholders, as well as on the possibility of doing so 
without costs or at reduced costs. In this respect, a unique facilitation is offered by 
Germany,  through a recently implemented shareholders’ digital forum in a “special 
section” in the Federal Electronic Bulletin. Any shareholder can take the initiative by 
sending his issue and contact address to the editor of the Federal Bulletin, who will 
publish it in a specifically designated section, that other shareholders can access free 
of costs. This institution can be used, as regards the “voice mechanisms”, to propose a 
vote on specific issue in shareholders meetings, or to convene a shareholders meeting 
on behalf of the company.    
    All three jurisdictions grant the right to proxy voting, to electronic voting and to 
vote by mail, in line with the Shareholders Right Directive; however, France poses 
limitations, concerning the persons to whom proxies can be conferred, which 
limitations would need to be removed, together with the practice of blank proxies to 
banks. There are indeed mechanisms intended to prevent to concentration of an 
excessive voting powers in the hands of few shareholders by virtue of either the 
proxies received and/or the votes vested in his shares. First, legal and statute 
provisions generally set the maximum number of votes that may be available to a 
shareholders including both proxies and the votes in his own name. Second, in the 
case of blank proxies, the president of the general meeting expresses, for each of these 
proxies, a favourable vote for proposals put forward by the board or by the directoire, 
and a negative vote for any other proposals; the shareholder can express a different 
vote by choosing a representative who accept to vote according to his indication. The 
blank proxies on their own do not appear, however, to be in line with the aim of the 
Shareholders’ Right Directive. On the other hand, the vote be mail in France is 
facilitated through the use of a specific form, which is taken to mean a vote against 
the deliberation if the form omits an express vote or if it indicates shareholders’ 
abstention.     
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can merely ask 
other 
shareholders a 













One further voice mechanism which is generally associated with minority 
shareholders’ protection – as a way to ensure a proportional expression to their voice - 
is the one share-one vote rule. Neither France nor the UK adhere strictly to this rule. 
In France,  double voting rights is possible if provided for in the bylaws, but only for 
fully paid shares held for at least 2 years. In the UK, any shareholder has one vote in 
respect of each share or each 10,00 £, of stock held, subject to any provision of the 
company’s articles which may thus allow multiple voting. Only Germany has banned 
multiple voting in 1998.    
Lastly, to facilitate the exercise of the voting right, none of the three jurisdictions 
currently requires share deposit or a block of shares before the meeting, and in this 
respect they already satisfy the requirement of the Shareholders Rights Directive.  
Germany, which used to require a share deposit until 2005, has subsequently adopted 
a record date system, as well as the UK; both jurisdictions require it to be no later than 
21 days before the meeting and, in this respect, already comply with the Directive.    
 
 
b) monitoring mechanisms 
 
The monitoring mechanisms are inherently connected with the voice mechanisms, by 
allowing minority shareholders to get the necessary information with a view to 
effective use of the voice mechanisms, and they are recognised, to a different extent, 
in all three jurisdictions.  
The right to ask questions, which according to the Shareholders Rights Directive must 
be ensured to shareholders as regards items on the agenda of the general meeting, is 
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France One or more 
minority 
shareholders 
holding at least 5% 
of share capital, or, 
in listed companies, 
the threshold 
required to form an 
Association and the 
Association 
themselves, are 
entitled to petition 
the court for the 
appointment of an 




aspects of the 
management of the 
company in the 
absence of a reply, 
within 1 month, to 
questions they have 
asked, and the 
expert must prepare 
a report answering 
the questions posed; 
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replace the statutory 
Either the board 
of directors or the 
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are necessary to 
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exercise their 




or making them 
available at the 
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at any time, each 
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of all the same 
documents that 
he can find at the 
company’s seat 
(see right to 
individual 
inspection).  
As of the 
communication 
by the board of 
directors or by 
the directoire,  
each individual 
shareholder 
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error, incapacity, or 
other good reason 
such as lack of 
impartiality or lack 
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be required 
(see right to 
review). 
as members 
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than 10% of 
voting rights; 
the minutes of 
meetings held 
during the last 
3 years  
Germany Shareholders 
holding at least 1% 
of the share capital 
or an amount of at 
least 100.000,00 € 
can request the 
court a special audit 
for due diligence, 
for the control of 
internal transactions 
and the gathering of 
information for 
future shareholders 
decision, if a 
decision to appoint 
the special auditor 
for due diligence is 




board must give 
information to 
shareholders 
related to the 
topics that the 
meeting is called 
to vote upon; 
however, any 
information that 
is published on 
the company’s 
Web site for at 
least 7 days prior 
to the meeting is 







can ask all 




to be relevant 








days of the 







days of the 






year, by means of 
a half-year 
financial report 
and, in the first 
and second 
halves, by 
interim reports or 
quarterly 
financial report 
UK In quoted 
companies, 
shareholders 
representing at least 
5% of the total 
voting rights, or at 
least 100 
shareholders 
entitled to vote  and 
holding shares with 
an average paid-up 
amount of at least 
100,00 £.per 
shareholder, are 
entitled to obtain an 
independent report 
on any poll taken or 
to be taken at the 
general meeting, 
and, for this 
purpose, directors 




holding the same 
threshold can 
require the 
company to publish 
on a website a 
statement setting 
out any matter 
relating to the audit 
of the company’s 
accounts (including 
the audit report and 
the conduct of the 
audit) to be laid 
down before the 
next accounts 
meeting, or any 
circumstance 
regarding an auditor 
ceasing to hold 
office since the 
previous accounts 
Each shareholder 
is entitled: to be 
sent copies of 
annual accounts 
and reports for 
each financial 
year; to be 
provided on 
demand  with 
copies of the 
company’s last 
annual accounts, 
the last directors’ 
report, the last 
directors’ 
remuneration 
report and the 
auditors’ report 
an accounts and 
all these reports; 
to be sent 
proposed written 
resolutions, to 
receive notice of 
general meetings 
and to be sent a 
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setting out the 
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both at the 
company’s 
registered 
office and at 




In Germany, shareholders can use the special section of the Federal Electronic 
Bullettin to take the initiative (and co-ordinate with each others for reaching the 
required threshold) to request the special investigation. Moreover, the restriction on 
the right to ask questions lying in the limitation of this right to questions that could be 
asked by a “reasonable shareholder” appears to be acceptable in light of the 
Shareholders Right Directive, as the right to ask questions and the obligation to 
answer are subject, under the Directive, to measures which Member States may take 
or allow companies to take to ensure – in addition to the identification of shareholders 
- the good order of general meetings and their preparation and the protection of 
confidentiality and business interest of companies37.  
By contrast, in the UK the implementation of the Shareholders Right Directive would 
require the right to ask questions to be expressly provided.   
 
 
c) shareholding defence mechanisms 
 
In all three jurisdictions, shareholder also enjoy pre-emptive rights to new issues of 
shares. This grants each shareholder the possibility to buy new issues of share 
according to the previously held shareholding quota, to maintain his shareholding 
unaffected. The pre-emptive right can be excluded only by a special resolution 
                                                 
37 Art. 9 
adopted, in the general meeting, by shareholders representing 75% of the share capital 
in both the UK and Germany, and two thirds of the share capital in France.     
 
d) exit mechanisms 
 
Minority shareholders’ right to exit by selling their shares at a fair price is recognised 
in takeover cases, as a result of the implementation of the 2004 EC Directive on 
Takeover Bids38 and thus of the mandatory bid rule provided for by the Directive. 
According to this rule, the acquirer of the control over a company is obliged to make a 
full takeover bid for all remaining voting shares of the company at an equitable price, 
which protects minority shareholders by granting them the right to sell their shares. 
The shareholding threshold which triggers the obligation to make a mandatory bid is 
defined at national level. 
National legislations also protect minority shareholders, after a successful takeover 
bid, by: a) requiring a bidder to compulsorily buy, at a fair price, the shares of the 
remaining minority shareholders who have not accepted the bid (squeeze out);  b) 
enabling minority shareholders, in the wake of such a bid, to require majority 





Mandatory bid under 
the mandatory bid 
rule of the Takeover 













shareholders’ right to 
request the 
acquisition of their 
shares by majority 
shareholders (sell 




Acquisition of more 
than 33,33% of the 
voting capital or of 
the voting rights, and 
acquisition of at least 
2% more of the 
voting capital or 
voting rights within 
less than 1 year by 
persons holding 
between 33% and 
50% of voting 
capital or voting 
rights 
Shareholders who, 
after a successful 
takeover, holds 95% 
of capital or voting 
rights has the right to 
squeeze out 
remaining 
shareholders;  the 
threshold applies to 
both the general 
corporate law 
squeeze-out and the 
implementation of 
the take-over bid 





request the financial 
market authority to 
order controlling 
shareholders with a 
95% or plus 
stockholding to buy 
their shares; the 
financial market 
authority will assess 







direct or indirect 
acquisition of 30% 
of the voting rights  
of the target 
company; the 
General corporate 
law squeeze-out: the 
general meeting 
may, upon request of 
a shareholder 
Take-over related 
sell out procedure: if, 
following a 
mandatory bid or a 
voluntary bid aimed 
                                                 
38 Directive 2004/25/EC, in OJ 2004 L 142 
obligation is 




into a concert party 
arrangement even if 
such an arrangement 
is not linked to the 
share acquisition 




decide the transfer of 
the shares of other 
shareholders to the 
principal 
shareholder, in return 




out: same threshold.  
at the acquisition of 
control, the bidder 
would be entitled to 




the right to accept 
the bid within 3 
months after the end 





acquisition of an 
interest in shares 
carrying 30% or 
more of the voting 
rights, and 
acquisition, by the 
holder of an interest 
in shares carrying 
between 30% and 
50% of the voting 
rights, of an interest 
in other shares which 
increase the 
percentage of voting 
rights in which he 
has an interest  
shareholder who 
have acquired  90% 
of the shares to 
which the offer 
relates, and 90% of 
the voting rights 
carried by those 
shares; minority 
shareholders can 
apply to the court to 
request that 
consideration higher 
than that offered in 







force the bidder to 
acquire their shares 
when the bidder 
holds 90% of the 
shares and 90% of 
the voting rights 




    Unsurprisingly, amongst the three jurisdictions, the UK – which through its City 
Code on Take Over and Mergers39 paved the way to the markets for corporate control, 
and which developed the world’s most active take-over market in relation to its size – 
is the one which offers the broadest definition of the conditions which trigger the 
obligation to make a takeover bid under the Take over bid Directive, the lowest 
thresholds for both squeeze-out and sell-out and the broadest scope of application of 
squeeze-out and sell-out provisions. The  “interest in shares” is in fact considered to 
arise: through ownership of the shares; through having the right to exercise or direct 
the exercise of the voting rights attaching to the shares; through having the right or the 
option to acquire the shares or call for their delivery or bearing an obligation to take 
delivery of them by virtue of any agreement to purchase, option or derivative; through 
being party to a derivative whose value is determined by reference to the price of the 
shares and which results, or may result, in having a long position in the shares. In 
turn, the squeeze-out and sell-out provisions, which are supplemented by well-settled 
rules intended to guarantee the fairness of the price, are deemed to apply equally to all 
companies and all bids, irrespective of whether or not the companies and bids 
concerned fall within the scope of the Takeover Bid Directive.  
                                                 
39 Originally dating back to 1968.  
      In the two other jurisdictions, the market for corporate control, take-over 
regulations and squeeze-out are much more recent and have been introduced by 
legislative provisions; these developments have also affected the implementation of 
the takeover bid Directive.  
     In France, the mandatory bid regime was first introduced by a 1989 law on security 
and transparency of the financial market40, was amended by subsequent regulations 
and resulted in a mandatory public bid by the holder of more than 33,33% of capital, 
or by the acquirer of at least an additional 2% within less than 1 year who already 
holds more than one third of the capital41; it was lastly supplemented by a right, 
granted to the holder of 95% of share capital, to propose a public withdrawal offer and 
by a right granted to the minority to petition the financial market authority to require 
the majority shareholder to buy all outstanding shares42. The Paris Court of Appeal, in 
exercising its power to review decisions by the financial market authority, has been 
paying particular attention to the “exit price”  paid to minority shareholders in either 
cases, and has been developing a “theory of equitable price” to scrutinise the 
adequacy of the price offered43.  Moreover, a 1993 law44 introduced a general 
squeeze-out procedure, allowing the holder of at least 95% of capital to squeeze out 
remaining shareholders after a buy-out offer has been made to the minority; in this 
procedure, the adequacy of the price offered must also be ensured and, for this 
purpose, the offer must submit to the financial market authority a project for the 
squeeze-out operation, which he is required to assess the shares he intends to buy and 
to get the acceptance of this assessment from the authority itself45. In implementing 
the Takeover bid Directive, the French legislator extended maintained the 95% 
threshold, but introduced a new squeeze out procedure which may be made within 3 
months of the end of the offer period at the offer price and which, unlike the pre-
existing squeeze-out procedure, need not be preceded by a buy-out offer. In any case, 
as a safeguard of the fairness of the price offered to minority shareholders, the 
financial market authority reviews the price of all public takeovers on the basis of a 
well-established multi-valuation criteria.           
   In Germany,  after a self-regulatory takeover regime based on a takeover code of 
1995, a general corporate law squeeze-out provision was introduced only in 200146, 
almost at the same time as the national take-over law47, which ended the self-
regulatory regime. Under the general corporate law squeeze out48 above indicated,  
although the cash settlement is determined by the principal shareholder, he must 
provide the general meeting with a written report which the appropriateness of the 
amount is explained and substantiated; the appropriateness of the cash settlement 
must be reviewed by one or more expert auditors chosen and appointed by the court 
                                                 
40 Loi du 2 aout 1989, Sécurité et transparence du marché financier. 
41 Règlement général Conseil de marchés financiers (CMF), Titre V, Chapter V, art. 5-5-2 and 5-5-4; 
after 2004 Règlement Général de l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), art. 234-2.   
42 Règlement général CMF, Titre V, Chapter VI, art. 5-6-1 to 5-6-4; after 2004 Règlement Général 
AMF, art. 236-2 and 236-3. The transaction is deemed to take place at the offer price (art. 236-7). 
43 C.Danglehant, Les nouveau statut des minoritaires dans les sociétés anonyms cotées; l’application du 
principle de l’équité, 1996 Revue des sociétés, p. 217 and A. Couret, L’évolution juridique du cadre, 
2002/5 Revue francaise de gestion 377, at 385.  
44 Loi n. 93-444 du 31 décembre 1993. 
45 Règlement Général AMF, Art. 237-1 and 237-2.  
46 Unternehmensubernahme-Regelungsgesetz 2001 (Law on the acquisition of Enterprises), BGBI. I 
3822 
47 WpUG (Take over Act), cit. 
48 Art. 327a et seq., AktG. 
and a shareholders’ meeting resolution is needed to carry out the squeeze-out. Also 
the national takeover-law, according to which upon reaching a threshold of 30% of 
the voting stock a shareholder has to make the mandatory bid, repeats the same 
provision, whereby upon reaching a 95% threshold a shareholder may squeeze out the 
minority by offering an appropriate cash payment. In the implementation of the 
Directive, Germany maintained the same threshold as in the general corporate law 
squeeze-out,  but no shareholder resolution is needed to carry out a takeover-related 
squeeze out falling within the scope of the Directive. 
   In addition to the conditions for mandatory bid, squeeze out and sell out, another 
aspect in which the implementation of the Directive diverges in the three Member 
States relates to an important principle introduced by the Directive itself, but in 
respect of which options were left to Member States during the negotiation process 
which lead, through a difficult compromise, to the adoption of the Directive itself. 
The principle at issue is the board neutrality rule, which prevents the board of the 
target company, during the bid period, from taking any action which may frustrate the 
bid without the prior authorisation of shareholders meeting, and which thus allow 
shareholders the final say on the future of the company.  The European Commission’s 
Report on the implementation of the Directive49 shows that, whereas the UK and 
France have chosen to apply the board neutrality rule, Germany has not, by making a 
choice which  reflects a preference for a more stable corporate control in comparison 
with the two other countries. At the same time, from the perspective of minority 
shareholders, this increases the importance of the protection mechanisms which are 
different from the “exit” ones and which encourage their activism.    
   
 
e) enforcement mechanisms 
    
     All three jurisdictions  -  which, with a limited exception for French commercial 
courts, on a loser-pay principle – allow both direct suits and the equivalent of US 
derivative suit. Any shareholder who has suffered damages not inflicted on other 
shareholders can bring (direct) suits to set aside the validity of shareholders’ meeting 
decisions or suit against directors; in case of damage to the company, the derivative 
suit is available with different rules. Steps to facilitate or to extend the possibilities of 
enforcement have been taken, in the last years, in all three jurisdictions.  
    In France, the right to challenge the validity of shareholders’ meeting resolution is 
granted without restrictions, as a shareholder can request the nullification of a 
resolution even if he was not such at the time of the vote or if he voted in favour50.     
French law has also been always “liberal” in allowing individual shareholders to 
bring, against directors,  actions for damages on behalf of the company (action sociale 
ut singuli),  the basis of which is civil liability, considered in light of directors’ duty to 
act “in the interest of the company”. Specifically, directors can be held liable for 
criminal offences, for violations of provisions of law or of the company’s statutes, and 
for mismanagement of the business due to imprudence or negligence. In alternative to 
individual suits, more shareholders can act collectively, either by appointing one or 
some amongst them to represent them if they held from 0,5% to 5% of the share 
capital depending on the amount of the capital itself, or by using the Association of 
Interests. From the factual viewpoint, individual shareholder suit has been historically 
                                                 
49 Commission Staff Working Paper  SEC (2007) 268, 21 February 2007, Reports on the 
implementation of the Directive on Take-over bid. 
50 Cassation Com. 4 July 1995, RJDA 8-9/95 n. 994  
a scarcely effective remedy, because the claimant bears the burden of proof and, to a 
greater extent, because the shareholder who wins the suit cannot, in commercial court, 
demand lawyers costs back from the loser whereas the shareholder who loses the suit 
has also no claim for reimbursement against the company. Nonetheless, recent 
developments (2003-2006) appear to have made enforcement easier, on the one hand 
by introducing a simplified procedure for injunctions, on the other hand by facilitating 
Associations in bringing actions as representatives. The simplified procedure allows 
any shareholder, who cannot obtain from directors the documentation he is entitled to 
receive, to ask the court either to order directors to communicate these or to appoint a 
“mandataire” entrusted to transmit the documents and all expense are to be borne by 
directors51. Associations  have been empowered to bring proceedings in case of direct 
or indirect prejudice to shareholders’ rights, and they can obtain a court injunction 
against directors or other persons whose conduct compromises the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights52. Although the Association must itself bear the costs for 
activating shareholders, there is a benefit in terms of cost reduction, from the 
viewpoint of individual shareholders, in comparison with personal proceedings.            
    With regard to derivative suits, the fact that this type of action challenges decisions 
that cause harm for all shareholders in proportion to their holding implies that, in a 
context where ownership tend to be concentrated, these action has little significance 
from the perspective of the protection of minority, non-controlling shareholders from 
possible abuses by controlling shareholders. Consistently with this reality,  the French 
judiciary has developed a doctrine of “abuse of majority power” to contrast the abuse, 
by controlling shareholders, of their power which derives from the majority 
shareholding. Any interested party – individual shareholders or others – who has a 
personal and legitimate interest can institute a claim on this basis; if the action is 
successful the court nullifies the decision which constitutes an abuse and awards 
damages to be paid by controlling shareholders. Again, if more individual investors 
such as minority shareholders have suffered personal damages which result from an 
action by the same person (e.g., a controlling shareholder) and which have a common 
origin, the claim may be brought by an Association of Interest in these investors’ 
name, provided the Association has been entrusted for this purpose by at least 2 
amongst the shareholders concerned53.  The “abuse of majority power” is defined as a 
decision, taken by the board or by shareholders’ meeting, that can be shown to have 
been made “against the general interest of the company and with the unique intention 
of favouring the majority to the detriment of the minority”54. The standard of scrutiny 
tends to be more stringent in case of board decisions, because the board is empowered 
to serve only the interest of the company, and less severe in case of decisions by the 
shareholders meeting, as shareholders’ voting rights may be used to take into account 
their private objectives as well. Accordingly, poor management or a policy that 
annoys the minority are not sufficient for there to be an abuse of power; for the abuse 
to be found, there must be a diversion of power in an illegitimate interest or an 
unjustifiable breach of equality among shareholders. Tunnelling, and excessive 
director remuneration decided by shareholder meeting (with the decisive vote of 
controlling shareholders), have been frequently found to constitute abuse.                      
                                                 
51 Art. 238-1 of the Code of Commerce, as amended by Ordonnance n. 2004-604, art. 51.  
52 Art. 452-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, as amended by Loi n. 2003-706, art. 15 and Loi n. 
2006-387 art. 26.   
53 Art. 452-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, as amended by Loi n. 2003-706 art. 126.  
54 Société des Anciens Etablissements Piquard, Com. April 18, 1961, Bull. III, No. 175, D. 1961, at 
661. 
    In Germany, over the last few years noticeable efforts have been made to facilitate 
enforcement and, at the same time, to minimise strike-suits. As regards the first 
aspect, since 2005 minority shareholders may bring a suit against members of the 
management board for mismanagement, in their own name and on behalf of the 
company, if they hold shares amounting to at least 1% of the share capital or, 
alternatively, € 100.000,00 and if they pass  a preliminary hearing in which the court 
assesses the merit of the case55. In this admission procedure, the claimants need to 
show that they unsuccessfully asked the supervisory board to bring the suit, that facts 
justifying a suspicion that the company suffered damages as a result of dishonesty of 
the management or a gross violation of the law or the company’s articles of 
association, and that from the perspective of the company there are no better reasons 
for abstaining from suing the officers. If the case is admitted to a full trial, the costs of 
the proceedings will be borne by the company even if the plaintiff loses on the final 
judgment, whereas if the preliminary hearing does not support the plaintiff, the latter 
can still proceed at his own risk. Again, shareholders taking the initiative can use the 
special section on the Federal Electronic Bulletin to co-ordinate amongst themselves 
for initiating the preliminary hearing.  
    According to a principle developed by the courts, in Germany any shareholder 
owes a duty of loyalty to all other shareholders, which includes a duty to promote the 
purpose of the company, a prohibition to damage the company and a further duty to 
exert their rights in a responsible manner. Consistently with this duty of loyalty, 
shareholders have the right of action to set aside shareholders’ meeting resolution, by 
bringing a suit against the company, not only in cases of infringement or the law or of 
the company’s statutes56 and on special grounds of defects concerning the election of 
supervisory board57, the proposals on profit allocations58 or the approval of annual 
financial statements59, but also in case of decisions which benefit, without 
justifications, one or more shareholders (such as controlling shareholders) over the 
others60. In this latter situation, every shareholder, whether present or not at the 
shareholders’ meeting, is entitled to sue. This becomes thus a protection for minority 
rights. Moreover, a shareholder can bring a suit to set aside shareholders meeting’s 
resolution if the suspect the management gave him incorrect or incomplete 
information. However, to avoid strike-suits, the right to challenge resolutions on 
ground of incomplete or incorrect information has been limited to the case where an 
objective shareholder would have considered the information to be essential for an 
appropriate realisation of his shareholders’ rights61, and the same condition applies 
where the management refuses to provide information. For the same reason, in case of 
certain operations – increase or reduction of the share capital or contract to enter a 
corporate group – a “clearance procedure” has recently been introduced; this 
procedure allows the court to permit the operation to proceed if the suit is groundless 
or if the violation of law which are alleged are less onerous to the company and the 
shareholders than any disadvantage that would be created by stopping the 
transaction62. It must also be noted that Germany, in 2005, took the first step towards 
                                                 
55 Art. 147a of the AktG, introduced by the 2005 Law concerning corporate integrity and modernisation 
of the right of avoidance (UMAG). 
56 Art. 243, 1st par., AktG.  
57 Art. 251, AktG 
58 Art. 254 AktG 
59 Art. 257 AktG 
60 Art. 243, 2nd par. AktG. 
61 Art. 243, 4th par., AktG.  
62 Art. 246a, AktG.  
the US-style “class actions”, by allowing this kind of actions in case of damage to 
investors deriving from information failures in the financial markets. Although is 
limited to suits for damages against securities issuers arising out of wrong or 
misleading or lacking information concerning listed companies, the mechanism 
introduced deserves attention for the way in which it facilitates the involvement by 
the mass of investors. In a preliminary proceeding, the plaintiff must prove that the 
claim at stake concerns an issue (e.g., wrong information) that can display its effects 
for other investors and other disputes too. Once satisfied in this respect, the court 
suspends the proceeding, to allow, within a period of 4 months, at least 9 other claims 
on the same issue to be brought. For this purpose, all preliminary proceedings are 
published in electronic form in the Federal bulletin and also disclosed in its Web site, 
so that other investors, who have not taken the initiative, can easily know the 
preliminary proceedings already brought and join the claim on the issue at stake. After 
having received at least the minimum number of claims at the expiry of the period, the 
court defines the object of a “standard proceeding” and remits it to the appellate court. 
In this second stage, a leading plaintiff is identified by the appellate court, and all 
other investors who intervened in the preliminary proceeding are invited to join. In the 
“standard proceeding”, before the appellate court, the individual investor does not 
incur the risk of bearing further legal costs and lawyers’ fees, beyond the costs for the 
technical advice which is necessary to ascertain the issuer’s responsibility and which 
are shared amongst the plaintiffs in relation to the value of each individual claim. 
After the appellate court has decided on the merit of the standard proceedings, with a 
judgment which is binding for the courts before which the proceedings was initially 
brought, each plaintiff continue its own proceeding for the determination of the 
amount of damages to which he is entitled before the latter court63. Arguably, the 
generalisation of this mechanism to all actions available to minority shareholders 
would be the decisive step towards an enforcement regime as effective as the US one.                  
      In the UK, under existing law a minority shareholder can rarely bring an action to 
challenge decisions taken by majority shareholders. Specifically, in England and 
Welsh the general principle, developed by the case-law and known as the “Foss v. 
Harbottle”64  rule, is that if these decisions has caused damage to the company only 
the company itself can sue, on ground that a shareholder suit would interfere with the 
decisions of the board of directors acting within its powers, and would enable the 
shareholder to replace the company itself as the proper claimant in respect of an 
alleged wrong done to it. This principle, on the ground that directors owe their 
fiduciary duties to the company and not to individual shareholders, and that the proper 
plaintiff is the company, creates a ban to (minority) shareholders’ individual suits on 
the part of the company (derivative suit) if the decision which the shareholders 
concerned wish to attack has been adopted by ordinary resolutions of the 
shareholders’ meeting (simple majority). In addition, if the wrong is capable of being 
ratified, even if there has been no formal ratification a minority shareholder may not 
bring a derivative suit. Nonetheless, the case-law65 has specified that the Foss v. 
Harbotte rule does not apply in cases of: a) ultra vires decisions, i.e. decisions going 
beyond the limits imposed by the articles of associations to directors’ powers; b) 
decisions which, according to the company’s statutes, had to be adopted by a qualified 
                                                 
63 The working of this class-action mechanism is governed in detail by a law on standard proceedings 
for the protection of financial investors (Law on Example Procedures for Investor Suits, 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrengesetz (KapMuG)), in force since 2005. 
64 (1843) 2 Hare 461 
65 Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 
majority but which were adopted by ordinary resolution; c) fraud on the minority, i.e. 
decisions taken purposely to prejudice minority shareholders; d) damage to individual 
shareholder’s personal interests.  Whereas the cases in a), b) and d) refers to situations 
which, by their very nature, fall outside the scope of the Foss. v. Harbottle principle, 
the key exception to the application of this principle is to be found in case c), i.e. 
where there would be a fraud on the minority if this wrong were allowed to stand. 
This can be the cases, e.g., where there has been an expropriation of company 
property or dishonest behaviour by a director, and the company is improperly 
prevented from bringing proceedings against the directors by the majority 
shareholders perhaps because the wrongdoing director controls the majority of votes.  
In Scotland, substantive law confers shareholders the right to bring action in their own 
name but on behalf of the company when the decision is fraudulent or ultra vires and 
so cannot be validated by a majority of shareholders, unless the majority of 
shareholders acting in good faith have validated or may validate the act.       
    The new Companies Act allows shareholders to bring suits in two cases: in respect 
of a cause of action vested in the company, and seeking relief on behalf of the 
company, in two situations:  in case of negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust by a director66, and for protection of shareholders against unfair prejudice67.      
As regards England and Welsh, the new legislation, when allowing the derivative suit 
for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director, does not 
formulate substantive rules for replacing the Foss v. Harbottle rule, but makes 
available the derivative suit for breach of directors’ duty to exercise reasonable care, 
skills and diligence, even if the directors has not benefited personally, and does not 
require the applicant to show that the wrongdoing directors controls the majority of 
company’s shares. However, the bringing of the action is subject to a two stages 
procedure, before the substantive suits begins. In the first stage the applicant must 
provide a prima facie case for being allowed to continue the claim, and the court must 
consider the issue on the basis of evidence provided by the applicant only; at this 
stage, the court must dismiss the application if what is filed does not demonstrate a 
prima facie case and may take any consequential order that it consider appropriate, 
e.g. a cost order. If the applicant is successful in the first stage, in the second stage the 
court may require evidence to be provided by the company, and  the Companies Act 
indicates the criteria that the court must take into account in deciding whether to allow 
the claim, and provides that it must refuse to allow the action to continue if it is 
satisfied that: a person acting in accordance with directors’ duty to promote the 
success of the company would not seek to continue the claim; the cause of action 
arises from an act or omission that is yet to occur has been authorised by the company 
or an act or omission which has occurred was authorised by the company before it 
occurred or has been ratified since it occurred. Among other factors, in considering 
whether to grant permission to continue the claim the court must have particular 
regard to any evidence before it concerning the views of shareholders who have no 
personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter.          
     The protection of shareholders against unfair prejudice is offered, in the new 
legislation68, by allowing an individual shareholder to seek judicial remedy if the 
company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interest of the members generally or of some part of its members 
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(such as minority shareholders), or if the proposed act or omission is or would be so 
prejudicial. A (minority) shareholder bringing action on ground of unfair prejudice 
must show that “the value of his shareholding  in the company has been seriously 
diminished or at least seriously jeopardised by reason of a course of conduct by those 
persons who have had de facto control of the company, which is unfair to the member 
concerned”69. The court has discretion as regards the type of redress that it may adopt 
if it finds the claim to be well grounded; the action for unfair prejudice has proven to 
be more effective than a derivative action under the Foss v. Harbottle rule. As a last 
remedy available to minority shareholders who consider their position in the company 
to be compromised and who are prevented from bringing the derivative claim by the 
Fosse v. Harbottle rule, they may apply to the court for obtaining the winding up of 
the company70, which would be ordered if the court considers it to be “just and 
equitable”. However, the court may not order the winding up if alternative solutions 
are possible, such as an “exit mechanism” for the plaintiff lying in the acquisition of 
his shares by majority shareholders. 
     
 
2.2.2. …and the indirect protection 
 
In addition to disclosure requirements and to the prohibition of insider dealing, the 
main provisions which are intended to contribute to the protection of minority 
shareholders generally rely on: 
a) the separation of functions and, in general, the establishment of “checks and 
balances” systems within company’s structure, which, starting from the well-known 
UK’s Cadbury Code (1992), has inspired the adoption of Corporate Governance 
Codes, i.e. “codes of best practice” generally requiring companies to comply with the 
rules that they indicate or to explain deviations from these rules, in many EC and 
OECD countries, and which has also been an area of EC intervention through 
measures adopted in the implementation of the APCLCG, namely the 2005 
Commission’s recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors 
of listed companies and on the committee of the (supervisory) board71 and, as regards 
the audit function and the responsibility of board members for the disclosure of 
financial information, Directive 2006/43/EC72 and Directive 2006/46/EC73;   
b) special majorities for particular shareholders decisions, on the ground that a 
supermajority, which from the viewpoint of controlling shareholders may be more 
difficult to reach than a simple majority, offers a better possibility for minority 
shareholders to take an active part in decision-making;  
c) a directors’ duty of loyalty intended as a duty not to put personal interests ahead of 
the company and of all its shareholders, and, in relation to this duty, a special 
discipline of possible situations of conflicts of interests between controlling 
shareholders or a management which is the expression of controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders; an important aspect within this area, directors’ remuneration 
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policy, has been the focus of a 2004 European Commission’s Recommendation on a 
remuneration regime74  
d)  a duty of care and the definition of the “corporate objective”, i.e. of the ultimate 
objective to be pursued by management.  
 
 
a)  As regards the EC measures which can be considered as falling in the area of 
“checks and balances”,  the  2005 Commissions’ Recommendation invites Member 
States to introduce a set of provisions concerning the role of non-executive or 
supervisory directors and the role of the committees of the supervisory board, to be 
used by listed companies, and it provided guidelines in this respect. This soft-law 
piece recommends:  
-the separation of the role of chief executive director (CEO) and board or supervisory 
board chairman (depending on the one – tier or two – tier system adopted by Member 
States);  
- a sufficient number of independent directors on the board or on the supervisory 
board, which, together with a set of independence criteria indicated by the 
Recommendation, is regarded as regarded as a key criteria to ensure that directors do 
not represent solely the interest of controlling shareholders;  
- the creation of nomination, remuneration and audit committees within the 
(supervisory) boards in cases where these tasks are not the direct responsibility of 
shareholders;  
- a strong presence of independent directors in board committees  and clear 
delineation of the role of these committees and, specifically, an at least majority 
number of independent non-executive or supervisory directors in the nomination 
committee, and the exclusive presence of non-executive or supervisory directors, the 
majority of whom should be independent, in the remuneration and in the audit 
committees;  
- transparency on independent board directors, through the disclosure of the 
competences of individual directors and of adequate information on the board’s 
determination of the directors’ independence;  
- high standards on qualifications and commitments of (supervisory board) members,  
to allow the required diversity of knowledge, judgement and experience to properly 
complete their tasks,  to ensure specific financial and accounting knowledge in case of 
members of the audit committee, to limit directors’ other commitments and ensure 
that the latter are disclosed. 
  A recent Commission’s report on the application of the Recommendation by 
Member States75 has shown a different situation in the three jurisdictions considered. 
Almost all recommendations have been implemented in the UK, where all criteria 
concerning independence, transparency and roles of committees are satisfied and only 
the recommendation to require disclosure of directors’ other commitments is not 
implemented. By contrast, in France the separation of the role of CEO and board 
chairman and the requirement of special knowledge for audit committee are not 
implemented. As regards the roles of CEO and board chairman, the concentration of 
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75 Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2007) 1021,13 July 2007, Report on the application by the 
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both powers in one person is allowed and the national Corporate Governance Code, in 
explaining that the law permits as organisational structures a dual board or a single 
board with or without the separation between the CEO and the chairman, only 
recommends that whatever option chosen by the company should be explained to 
shareholders. In Germany, the independence requirement does not appear to be 
implemented, as the absence of close links between board members and controlling 
shareholders, which is one of the main criteria listed by the Commission, is not 
recommended at all, and the Corporate Governance Code, which only requires the 
supervisory board to include what it considers to be an adequate number of 
independent members, considers a supervisory board member to be independent if he 
has no business or personal relations with the company or its management board 
which causes a conflicts of interests. Moreover, whereas in both the UK and France 
the creation of a remuneration committee is required on a comply or explain basis, in 
Germany it is recommended only and deviations from this rule does not need to be 
explained.  
    Despite its non-binding nature, which has resulted in the non implementation of 
some of its key recommendations, the Commission’s Recommendation owe its 
importance to the stated objective of promoting standards ensuring that boards of 
listed companies offer sufficient guarantees of independence and, in doing so, of 
promoting the convergence of national corporate governance codes and, ultimately, of 
allowing investors to benefit from an equivalent level of protection and transparency 
throughout the EC. At the current stage of the Recommendation implementation, its 
limits in achieving this goal will be able to be outweigh in part by Directive 2003/43, 
to be transposed by the end of June 2008, which has extended to all EC listed 
companies the obligation to have an audit committee or a body performing equivalent 
functions, and to a greater extent by Directive  2006/46,  to be transposed into 
national law by September 2008.  This Directive increases the financial and non-
financial information to be disclosed by companies, in particular by listed companies 
which are required to include a corporate governance statement in annual reports, and 
establishes the collective responsibility of all board members for all information 
disclosed and for the corporate governance report. Whereas the additional financial 
and non-financial information to be disclosed include off-balance items and 
transactions with related parties,  the information to be provided for in the corporate 
governance report must include at least: the corporate governance practices actually 
applied, including a description of the main features of any existing risk management 
systems and internal controls in relation to the financial reporting process; the 
operation of the shareholders meeting and its key powers, and a description of 
shareholders’ rights and how they can be exercised; the composition and operation of 
administrative, management and supervisory bodies and their committees. The 
corporate governance report required by the Directive, which latter is formulated in 
clear and precise terms and thus deemed to have direct effect if not timely and/or 
properly implemented, allows (minority) shareholders to have a complete and easy 
knowledge of their rights and of the composition and operation of the same organs 
whose independence and proper functioning has been addressed by the Commission 
Recommendation; this can allow shareholders, together with the additional financial 
and non-financial information, to assess the proper working of the internal “checks 
and balances” system and thus the reduction of the risks of failures of this system.        
    
 
b) Qualified majority requirements extend to a wider range of shareholders decisions 
in France and in Germany than in the UK, although they are common to all three 
jurisdictions in cases of changes in bylaws or articles of association, capital increases, 
































France 2/3 2/3  2/3 2/3  2/3 2/3 
Germany 3/4 3/4 3/4 ¾ ¾ 3/4 3/4 3/4 
UK  3/4 50% + 1   ¾  3/4  
 
 
c) The most important of the individual principle amongst the OECD Principles, 
which concerns directors’ duties, states that “Board members should act on a fully 
informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care and in the best interest of 
the company and its shareholders” and, in this statement, it indicates as key elements  
a duty of care (“..act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and 
care”) and a duty of loyalty (“..in the best interest of the company and its 
shareholders”).  
    The duty of loyalty to the company and to all its shareholders, which is regarded by 
the Principles as a key to protecting minority shareholders76, underpins the effective 
implementation of other principles relating to, e.g., the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, monitoring of related party transactions and the establishment of 
remuneration policy for key executive and board members77, which principle are 
ultimately aimed at  detecting possible conflicts of interests and preventing abusive 
self-dealings. In this respect, solutions are offered in all three jurisdictions, which 
solutions generally consist in the pre-authorisations of particular transactions, and, as 
regards remuneration policy, were recommended by the Commission. 
    In France, a special regime which has long been in existence for directors’-related 
party transactions has been extended in recent years, by laws78 intended to strengthen 
the protection of minority shareholders, to transactions involving significant 
shareholders. Specifically, the Code of Commerce requires that all transactions 
between the company and board members, including those with parties related to 
board members - unless these transactions are considered to be “current transactions 
entered into at normal conditions” - must receive the prior approval by the board, 
must be communicated to auditors, who prepare a special report on these transactions, 
and must be ratified by the general shareholders meeting by means of a resolution on 
the auditors’ special report79. This regime of approval by the board and ratification by 
shareholder meeting also applies to transactions involving any shareholder holding 
more than 10% of the voting rights or the parent company, and, in shareholders’ 
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meeting called upon to vote on transactions involving these significant shareholders, 
the shareholder concerned does not enjoy voting rights and his shares are not 
considered in the determination of the quorum and of the majority for deliberation. 
Moreover, in listed companies, this regime has been further extended in 2005 to 
executive compensation schemes which grant board members a lump-sum bonus at 
the time of appointment or dismissal80. Lastly, in principle the law prevents 
individuals who are board members or related parties from receiving loans or any 
form of security from the company81  . Uniquely amongst all jurisdictions considered, 
in France the self-dealings transactions above indicated, in case that the required the 
ex ante authorisation of the board was not obtained and the transaction have produced 
damages to the company, can be annulled at the initiative of individual shareholders, 
who have standing to bring a claim for this purpose82.    
     In Germany, the concern to prevent conflicts of interest is addressed in relation to 
both members of the management board and members of the supervisory board, 
which are all bound by the enterprise’s best interest. The Stock Corporation Act 
establishes a prohibition to compete with the company83 ,  does not allow companies 
to grant a credit to the board members84  and limits self-dealing transactions85, whose 
regulation is also indicated in detail in the Corporate Governance Code. This latter 
specifies that neither members of one of these bodies may pursue personal interests in 
his decisions or use, for himself, business opportunities intended for the company. 
Members of the management board may not, in connection with their work, demand 
or accept from third parties payments or other advantages for themselves or for any 
other person nor grant third parties unlawful advantages, and, in case of operations in 
which he can have a personal interest contrasting with that of the company, any 
member of the management board must inform the other members and disclose the 
conflicts of interests to the supervisory board  without delay. All transactions between 
the company and members of the management board must comply with market 
conditions which are standards customary in the specific sectors, and important self-
dealing transactions must be approved by the supervisory board. The approval of the 
supervisory board is also required for members of the management board to be able to 
take on sideline activities, such as supervisory board mandates in other companies. In 
turn, each member of the supervisory board must inform all other members of any 
conflicts of interest which may result from a role of consultant or directorship 
function with clients, suppliers, lenders or other business partners, and, in its report to 
the shareholders’ meeting, the supervisory board must inform shareholders about any 
conflicts of interest which have occurred and about the manner in which these have 
been overcome. The conflicts of interests which are not temporary ones determine the 
termination of the mandate. Moreover, a member of the supervisory board can enter 
advisory and other service agreements and contract for work with the company only 
with the supervisory board’s approval; lastly, another category of operations which is 
regarded as potential source of conflicts of interests, namely dealings by members of 
the management and/or supervisory board in shares of the company, and, in this 
respect, the ownership by management board or supervisory board members of share 
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ownership exceeding 1% must be disclosed in the corporate governance report. In 
Germany, individual shareholders, unlike shareholders in France, do not have 
standing to challenge management board resolutions concerning self-dealing 
transactions entered into without the required authorisation of the supervisory board, 
as only the power to sue members of the management board for breach of duties rests 
with the supervisory board, which may be required to do so by either a general 
shareholders’ meeting vote by simple majority or by minority shareholders. As 
previously indicated86, in 2005 the necessary minority shareholders threshold has 
been lowered, and this offers a better protection to minority shareholders in case of a 
supervisory board reluctant to bring suits against the management board (which the 
common case, given that a suit against the management board for breach of duties 
would indicate a failure by the supervisory board to exercise effectively its monitoring 
role).   
   The unique institution offered by the German legislator to prevent conflicts of 
interest between controlling and minority shareholders can be found in a specialised 
area of corporate law dealing with groups (“Konzernrecht”), which indicates specific 
duties of loyalty that controlling shareholders owe to minority shareholders.  
Controlling shareholders have a choice between entering into a formal control 
agreement with minority shareholders or taking control of the company without this 
agreement. If controlling shareholders decide in favour of such an agreement, they 
must offer an adequate compensation, which must induce a dividend guarantee and an 
offer to buy the outstanding shares. This mandatory compensation is subject to review 
and report  by public accountants; subsequently, a separate meeting of minority 
shareholders is called upon to decide about the agreement, but the compensation 
remains subject to judicial review ex post. After the control agreement is entered into, 
the equity investment by minority shareholders is transformed into a debt-like security 
issued by dominant shareholders, and the majority owners are relieved from various  
formalities in directing the company’s businesses, although the company continues to 
hold annual meetings. If the controlling shareholders choose not to enter the 
agreement, they must not influence the business to their advantage without immediate 
financial compensation to the company: in this respect, specific means of protection 
for minority shareholders include mandatory disclosure by the board of management, 
a review, by public accountants, of management conduct concerning corporate 
opportunities and assets diversion, and liability in cases of misconduct. Transactions 
amongst affiliated companies – which may represent avenues for assets diversion by 
controlling shareholders – must be described in an annual report of control 
relationships, which must be prepared by independent auditors and aims at ensuring 
that these transactions takes places at arm’s –length prices.   
   In the UK, several provisions of the new Companies Act address potential conflicts 
of interests situation. A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has 
or can have a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with 
the interest of the company, which applies in particular to the exploitation of any 
property, information or opportunity87. Nevertheless, this duty is not infringed if the 
situation “cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest” 
or if the matter has been authorised by directors; in turn, the authorisation is effective 
only if any requirement concerning the quorum at the meeting at which the matter is 
considered is met without counting the director concerned or any other interested 
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director, and the matter was agreed to without their voting or would have been agreed 
to if their votes had not been counted. In relation to transactions or arrangements 
between the directors and the company, the director of a company must declare, to 
other directors, the nature and extent of any interest both in a proposed transaction or 
arrangement and in existing transactions or arrangements88. Moreover, specific 
transactions with directors require shareholders’ approval89: directors’ long-term 
service contracts; substantial property transactions, i.e. purchases and sales of 
substantial non-cash assets between a director and the company, where an asset is 
regarded as substantial if its value exceeds 10% of the company’s and is more than 
5.000,00 £. or exceeds 100.000,00 £.; loans to directors, quasi-loans and credit 
transactions; payments for loss of office.  In connection with the requirement of 
shareholders’ approval for loans to directors, quasi-loans and credit transactions, a 
resolution approving the transaction must not be passed unless a memorandum 
specifying the nature, the amount, the purpose of the transaction and the extent of the 
company’s liability under any connected transaction is made available to 
shareholders. This availability can be ensured either by sending or submitting the 
memorandum to each shareholder at or before the time the proposed resolution is 
submitted to him, in the case of  a written resolution, or by making the memorandum 
available for inspection by shareholders both at the company’s registered office for at 
least 15 days before the meeting and at the meeting itself. The approval for substantial 
property transaction is not required for transactions between the company and a 
shareholder90. In case of transactions entered into between the company and any 
directors without the required shareholders approval, these transactions are, in 
principle, voidable at the instance of the company, and give rise to the concerned 
directors’ liability towards the company itself.               
   One of the typical issue in which a conflict of interest between shareholders and 
management can emerge, the directors’ remuneration policy, has been addressed by 
the 2004 Commission’s Recommendation on directors’ remuneration, which mainly 
invites Member States to require:  the disclosure of remuneration policy, for the 
purpose of strengthening accountability to shareholders; the shareholders’ vote on 
remuneration policy, on the assumption that shareholders can influence the 
company’s remuneration policy solely through debate and vote at the general 
meeting; the disclosure of the remuneration of individual directors, and the disclosure 
of each remuneration component, to allow shareholders to assess the remuneration in 
light of the company’s performance; the prior approval of share and share options-
based schemes by shareholders’ meeting, in order to limit the potentially negative 
effects that these schemes may generate on directors’ conduct, e.g. in terms of 
“temptation” to overstate the reported financial performance of the company to which 
shares price is linked.  
   The Commission’s report on the implementation of the Recommendation91 shows 
that, amongst the three jurisdictions under consideration, only the UK has 
implemented all the recommendations. Whereas the recommendations concerning the 
disclosure of remuneration policy, the shareholders’ vote on remuneration policy and 
the disclosure of the remuneration of individual directors are implemented on a 
“comply or explain” basis, the prior shareholders approval of share and share options 
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based remuneration schemes is required by law. France – where the disclosure on 
remuneration policy, the general meeting vote on this policy and the disclosure of 
remuneration of individual board members are required by law -  has implemented 
only in part the recommendation concerning the prior shareholders approval of share 
and share options based remuneration schemes. In fact, the general meeting decides 
on share options only, and determine the main conditions of the granting process for   
the benefit of the management only. In Germany, the recommendations on disclosure 
of remuneration policy, shareholders’ vote on remuneration policy and disclosure of 
remuneration of individual board members are all partly implemented. The 
remuneration policy is disclosed to a different extent for the members of the 
management board and of the supervisory board. For management board members, 
the Corporate Governance Code, on a comply or explain basis, requires the chairman 
of the supervisory board to outline the salient points of the compensation system and 
any changes thereto to shareholders’ meeting, whereas disclosure of the policy on 
supervisory board members’ remuneration is recommended without a comply or 
explain obligation. A resolution of shareholders’ meeting is required for the 
remuneration of supervisory board members, and, because the criteria for this 
remuneration are specifically indicated in the responsibilities and scope of their tasks 
as well as in the economic situation and performance of the company, the approval of 
remuneration policy appear to be in part required, but the remuneration policy of 
management board members is not subject to a specific approval of the general 
meeting. Lastly, disclosure of remuneration of each management board members is 
required as a default rule, as it can be excluded by the general shareholders’ meeting 
by 75% majority.       
 
   
d) As regards the duty of care, i.e. the duty to act on a fully informed base, in good 
faith, with due diligence and care in pursuing the corporate objective, the three 
jurisdictions use either expressly or implicitly a standard of reference, and apply 
either a  “business judgement rule”, in the case of Germany, or equivalent criteria, in 
the case of France and the UK.  
 
Specifically, in France the corporate objective is identified in the “interest of the 
company”, described as “the overriding claim of the company considered as a 
separate economic agent, pursuing its own objectives which are distinct from those of 
shareholders, employees, creditors including the internal revenue authorities, 
suppliers and customers,  which nonetheless represents the common interest of all 
these persons, which is for the company to remain in business and to prosper’92. The 
continuity and the prosperity over time of the business enterprise is thus the ultimate 
purpose to be pursued, by adopting the behaviour of a reasonably prudent person. 
This standard of reference appears to emerge from the fact that directors do not incur 
liability for errors of business judgement, unless negligence is ascertained; courts are 
in general reluctant to second guess directors’ decisions and use discretion in 
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verifying whether negligence has occurred, but, when this is the case, directors are 
liable without any restrictions93.       
 
In Germany, the jurisdiction which has been consistently indicated as the one more 
oriented towards the “stakeholder model” of companies according to which 
companies have to be managed in the interests of both shareholders and all other 
constituencies, the Corporate Governance Code specifies that the management board 
is responsible for independently managing the enterprise and that, in so doing, it is 
obliged to act in the enterprise’s best interest and “undertakes to increase the 
sustainable value of the enterprise”94 . The duty of care that applies in pursuance of 
this corporate objective requires both management and supervisory board members to 
act with the due care and diligence of “a prudent and conscientious” person95. The 
German legislator has codified in 2005 the “business judgment rule” developed in the 
US and introduced in Germany by the courts; according to this rule, in case of 
business decisions an infringement of duty is not present if the member of the 
management or supervisory board could reasonably believe, by gathering appropriate 
information and avoiding gross negligence, that he was acting in the best interest of 
the company. However, where this negligence is found, the law establishes a 
comprehensive liability.       
 
In the UK, s. 172(1) of the new Companies Act has codified the corporate objective in 
terms  of  “enlightened shareholder value”, by requiring a director to “..act  in a way 
that he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard 
(amongst other matters) to - (a)The likely consequences of any decision in the long 
term; (b) the interests of the company’s employees; (c)the need to foster the 
company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; (d)the impact 
of the company’s operations on the community and the environment; (e)the 
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, and (f)the need to act fairly between the members of the company.” 
Interestingly, this new codification, in a jurisdiction which has been traditionally 
regarded as embracing the “shareholder primacy” approach, i.e. as prioritising the 
interest of shareholders over the concerns of other categories of corporate 
constituencies, was originated by the awareness that the promotion of the interests of 
shareholders usually require the interests of other constituencies – listed in s. 172(1) – 
to be promoted too, and that,  at the turn of the century, a wide perception by directors 
of their duties had indicated as the primary goal the short-term increase of share 
prices, at the expense of the long-term financial health of the business96. The  
provision at stake has been regarded, by commentators, as embracing an inclusive but 
not stakeholder model of the company, as it has been stressed that, under this 
provision, when the interests of shareholders clash with those of other constituencies 
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directors must give priority to shareholders’ interests by promoting the success of the 
company for the benefit of all shareholders97. However, a definition of success of the 
company was omitted in the provision - although ministerial statements indicated that 
“success of the company” means what shareholders collectively intend to achieve and, 
for commercial companies, it normally means long-term increase in value -  and 
directors, in pursuing this objective, must exercise the same standards of care, skills 
and judgment that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with the general 
knowledge, skills and experience that may be expected for carrying out the same 
functions as the director in relation to the company at issue (an objective test), and 
with the general knowledge, skills and experience the director actually has (a 
subjective test)98.  As regards potential directors’ liability, Governmental Explanatory 
Notes have specified that the corporate objective in terms of success of the company 
“does not require a director to do more than good faith and the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence would require, nor would it be possible for a 
directors acting in good faith to be held liable for a process failure which would not 
have affected his decision as to which course of action would best promote the success 
of the company”99, and that “the decision as to what will promote the success of the 
company, and what constitutes such success, is one for the director’s good faith 
judgment’100, which “ensures that business decisions on, for example, strategy and 
tactics are for the directors, and not subject to decision by the court, subject to good 
faith”101.  Commentators102 have argued that courts, which have traditionally been 
reluctant to second guess business decisions, will not change this attitude, and that 
what will continue to apply is a “subjectivisation” of liability developed by the case-
law103 and applied up to date, which produces the same outcome as a business 
judgment rule.  
 
Although the formulation of the corporate objective in the three countries (continuation 
and prosperity over time of the business enterprise; increase of the sustainable value of 
the enterprise; the success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole) 
tend to express similar concepts in different words, and the business judgment rule tend 
or its equivalent tend to safeguard managerial discretion, it can be noted that in 
Germany, in disputes about whether any management board member acted in due care 
brought following a damage to the company (and thus, indirectly, to minority 
shareholders too)  a violation of the duty of care is deduced, unless the board member 
concerned proves otherwise (although, in so doing, he is facilitated by the business 
judgment rule). The rule, which is intended to facilitate the supervisory board – which 
has standing to bring the action on behalf of the company against the managers - in its 
monitoring the management board,   would be however of little practical effect in cases 
where both the supervisory board and the management board were influenced by 
controlling shareholders and these have taken personal advantages from operations 
generating on the whole a damage to the company, as the supervisory board could be 
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expected in these situations to collude with the management board. The recently 
introduced provision aimed at increasing minority shareholders powers to sue 
derivatively, by granting them this right if representing 1% of the share capital or 
100.000,00 €, which has lowered the threshold previously consisting of 10% of capital 
or 1 million €, was aimed at offering a better remedy against these situations.     
 
 
2.3. A comparative assessment and the partial fallacy of the comparison 
 
   If the US and the three EC jurisdictions considered here are assessed against each 
others, the differences and the similarities which emerge from the comparative view, 
and in light of the OECD Principles, may be recapitulated as follows. 
   The clear differences lie in the stronger “voice” and “monitoring” mechanisms 
available to minority shareholders in France and in Germany than in the US, with the 
UK in the between, and in the wider possibility for minorities in France and Germany 
to affect extraordinary shareholders’ meeting decisions thanks to the qualified 
majority requirements, and, on the other hand, in the stronger “checks and balances” 
mechanisms in the two Anglo-Saxon countries than in both France and Germany; 
these stronger checks and balances appears to be evident for the US in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act requirements and, for the UK, in the fact that the European Commission’s 
Recommendation concerning independent directors can be seen as (almost) fully 
implemented only in this jurisdiction. As regards the voice and monitoring 
mechanisms, the comparison clearly shows greater possibilities for minority 
shareholders of French and German companies to interact with management in the 
formation and alteration of the general meeting agenda, and to activate special audits, 
than for shareholders in both the US and the UK. The limitations implied on the 
effectiveness of these kind of rights - which may derive from the threshold 
requirements,  from co-ordination costs and from the fact that in the two continental 
European jurisdictions the ownership is far more concentrated than in the US and the 
UK, which implies a management elected ultimately by the controlling shareholders – 
are being gradually removed by the increased facilitation of coordinated initiatives 
among minority shareholders, through the Association of Interests in France and the 
new special section of the Federal Electronic Bulletin in Germany. While strong 
checks and balances mechanisms, which were first recommended in the UK by the 
Cadbury Code, are certainly a key to protection of shareholders against management 
and of minority shareholders against controlling shareholders, and are fully consistent 
with the OECD principle requiring the equitable treatment of all shareholders104,  the 
steps undertaken in both France and Germany are capable of increasing the minorities 
protection in these two jurisdictions too and are certainly consistent with the 
objectives indicated by the OECD as regards the rights of shareholders and key 
ownership function: in fact, according to the Principles, “the corporate governance 
framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights”105 and, 
for this purpose, (all) shareholders should, inter alia, have the opportunity to ask 
questions to the board, to place items on the general meeting agenda and to propose 
resolutions, “subject to reasonable limitations”106, as well as to participate effectively 
in key decisions. In addition, the comparative view show that these kinds of 
differences, concerning the rule in place, tend to decrease: whereas in the US, after 
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the corporate collapses, “voice mechanisms” have been increased107 and in the UK 
the introduction of the Shareholders Right Directive is deemed to play the role of 
strengthening these mechanisms, in both France and Germany the desire to attract 
international investors, and the likely Commission’s continued efforts to press for the 
compliance with the Recommendation on independent directors, are deemed to 
enhance the checks and balances systems, which the respective Corporate Governance 
codes have already introduced.                      
    The similarities emerge in a key aspect concerning non controlling shareholders 
and the overall corporate objective, in addition to disclosure and transparency 
requirements and to the liability concerning this disclosure. Disclosure requirements, 
as the literature has already documented108, are converging towards the Anglo-Saxon 
standards -  an important example may easily be found in the requirement both in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and in the EC Directive 2006/46 to disclose off-balance sheets 
transactions – and the consequent similarities extend to the responsibility for the 
reliability of information disclosed, as proved by the certification by both the CEO 
and the CEF imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and by the collective responsibility 
of all board members required by the Directive 2006/46. The similarity in the key 
aspect regarding non controlling shareholders in their relation with controlling 
shareholders is evidenced by the minority oppression doctrine in the US, by the abuse 
of majority power doctrine in France, by the duty of mutual loyalty of shareholders 
towards each others in Germany and by the fraud on minority case in the UK, all of 
which share the same purpose to contrast majority shareholders behaviours which are 
clearly directed against the minority, have the potential for (further) development by 
the judiciary and pursue the objective indicated by the OECD Principles in the 
Chapter devoted to the equitable treatment of shareholders, whereby “Minority 
shareholders should be protected from abuse action by, or in the interest of, 
controlling shareholders..”109. The achievement of this goal indicated by the OECD – 
towards which, ultimately, is also directed, if management is the expression of 
controlling shareholders, the regulation which is aimed in all jurisdictions at 
preventing possible conflicts of interests situation arising in self-dealings, and which 
is related to directors’ duty of loyalty to the company and to all shareholders  - could 
however not be considered without the enforcement aspect. The OECD principle 
completes the statement by specifying that minority shareholders “..should have 
effective means of redress”. In this respect, the remedies against cases of damages 
inflicted on minority shareholders by resolutions adopted at the general meeting (with 
controlling shareholders’ determinant vote), and the remedies against cases of 
damages to the minority caused by decisions of directors who, in having regard, by 
assumption, only to the interest of controlling shareholders, infringe the duty of 
loyalty to the company and to all shareholders, come both into play. Direct suits 
result, in all jurisdictions, more effective than derivative suits, by reason of the 
procedural hurdles on the latter – as it occurs in the US and the UK - or in any case of 
to the scarce incentive towards their use, as it is the case in France and, in part, 
Germany, where, however, the new pre-hearing procedure, which allows minority 
shareholders holding a very low threshold to proceed free of costs in case of 
favourable court’s preliminary assessment encourages their activism through this 
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route. On the other hand, the class-action mechanism, and lawyers’ contingency fees, 
have clearly given US shareholders an advantage – in comparison with minority 
shareholders in the other jurisdictions - in either direct or derivative suits. However, 
similarities are gradually emerging in this respect too, as demonstrated by the 
facilitation of enforcement by Associations of Interest in France and by a class action 
procedure introduced by Germany in 2005 against cases of alleged company’s false 
statements when issuing shares, and are probably deemed to result in class-actions 
being introduced in Europe in light of a seemingly general support recently 
expressed110. Furthermore, the similarities can be noted as regards the duty of care  
which has to be applied in pursuing the corporate objective too, and, ultimately, in the 
corporate objective. The shareholders’ interests primacy in the US, the continuation of 
the business activity in France, the increase of the sustainable value of the enterprise 
in Germany and the success of the company for the benefit of the member as a whole 
(enlightened shareholder value) in the UK are all directed, ultimately, at stating the 
condition in order for minority shareholders’ rights to be exercised over time towards 
other shareholders and/or towards the management, and for their investment in the 
company to be safeguarded. In this respect, however, the corporate objective as stated 
in France, Germany and the UK also brings directly into consideration the “objective 
aspect” of these investors protection, as it will be subsequently emphasized in  
paragraph 4. 
     Whereas the differences and the similarities, taken together, seem to suggest that, 
at present, France and Germany, through the (still) comparatively stronger voice and 
monitoring mechanisms have gone farther in the implementation of the OECD 
principle relating to the facilitation of shareholders’ involvement, whereas the US and 
the UK, through the (still) comparatively stronger checks and balances and in 
particular for the US through the (still) comparative advantage offered by the class 
action mechanism, have gone father in the implementation of the OECD principle 
requiring the equitable treatment of shareholders, such a comparative assessment also 
reveals a partial fallacy, and not only because of the gradual convergence above 
indicated which may deprive, to some extent,  this kind of assessment of its own 
purpose. The partial fallacy derives from the fact that, as noted by the Methodology, 
jurisdictions need to be ranked not against each others but in relation to what they can 
and need to achieve111, to secure investors protection, in light of their own internal 
situation. This implies that each jurisdiction, as regards the “subjective” aspect of 
minority shareholders’ protection, needs to ensure the most suitable legal tools in 
light of the structure and patterns of corporate ownership in that jurisdiction. E.g., it 
can thus be argued that,  in assessing the effective implementation of the OECD 
principle whereby shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the 
board, to place items on the general meeting agenda and to propose resolutions, 
“subject to reasonable limitations”, the reasonableness of the limitations depends on 
the link between management and controlling shareholders: the closer the link, the 
lower need to be the limitations – in general - on minority shareholders’ voice 
mechanisms and the greater the extent to which monitoring mechanisms need to be 
enhanced. In this sense, the overall stronger and monitoring voice mechanisms in 
France and Germany appears to be appropriate in light of the concentrated ownership 
structure, and the same applies to devices, such as the double voting right in France 
and the requirement of two-years ownership for registering an Association of Interest, 
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which are intended to encourage, in a context of ownership concentration, the long-
term commitment of minority shareholders to their investment. In turn, this long-term 
commitment, in additional to the beneficial effect of providing companies with an 
higher amount of “patient capital”112, undoubtedly encourages an effective minority 
activism, which is a prerequisite for preventing abuses on the part of controlling 
shareholders. Accordingly, a mechanism as the one share one vote rule, which was 
indicated by the literature amongst the rights ensuring shareholders protection113 in a 
context of more dispersed ownership, may not necessarily be regarded as such in a 
context of more concentrated ownership, where, without the encouragement of long-
term commitment of minority shareholders, the potential for abuse by controlling 
shareholders could be expected to be higher. These observations also apply, e.g., to 
the regimes for self-dealing transactions, where in France the extension of the regimes 
of board approval to transactions between the company and significant shareholders, 
and the empowerment of minority shareholders to sue for nullification of these 
transactions if entered into without the required board approval are consistent with a 
concentrated ownership structure to the same extent as the exemption, in the UK, 
from the approval regime for property transactions with shareholders is 
understandable in light of a more dispersed ownership structure in which the 
shareholder entering into the transaction is not a controlling one.      
   Consequently, in the context of the debates on convergence and path-dependency, a 
first conclusion can be drawn about the kind of desirable convergence. 
 
3. The possible and the desirable future developments ….. 
 
3.1. The factors inducing formal convergence… 
 
    Undoubtedly, globalisation and the market-driven process which lead companies to 
seek cross listing in those financial markets, namely the US and the UK, which are 
regarded as most liquid and as offering ‘reputation bonding’, can be expected to 
continue to generate an international convergence towards the Anglo-American model 
as regards the formal rules concerning disclosure and transparency and the internal 
governance practices in terms of independence requirements of directors and special 
committees members, which requirements are intended to ensure the working of 
checks and balances mechanism.  This convergence was, ultimately, accepted at least 
twice by the EC. First, in its efforts of increasing, by way of harmonisation, the 
standards of disclosure, the level of transparency and efficient capital markets 
functioning (through Directives such as the Prospectus Directive and the Market 
Abuse Directive), and the ultimate outcome should be, over time, that of allowing 
continental Europe markets to offer advantages equivalent to those of Anglo-
American markets, and thus a comparable investors protection in terms of 
transparency and of liquidity. Second, in the APCLCG and in implementing 
initiatives such as Directives 2006/43, 2006/46 and the two Recommendations on the 
remuneration of directors and on independent directors. In fact, in the APCLCG the 
European Commission expressly stated that “In many areas,  the EU shares the same 
broad objectives and principles of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and in some areas robust, 
equivalent approaches already exist in the EU. In some other areas, new initiatives are 
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necessary. Earning the right to be recognized at least as equivalent alongside other 
national and international rules is a legitimate and useful end in itself”114.     
   Whereas globalisation and the market-driven process, in which the US can be 
expected to continue to have an interest not to discourage the search for listing in its 
capital markets by European companies115 at the same time as the EC has in interest 
to increase the attractiveness of its capital markets at least to an equivalent level to the 
US market (which would be consistent with the “Lisbon-agenda”), can be expected to 
continue to generate the type of convergence above indicated between the US and the 
EC,  a second factor which can be expected to induce a “market-driven” formal 
convergence within the EC lies in the inter-jurisdictional competition which has been 
fostered by the case-law of the Court of Justice on the exercise of the right of 
establishment. Since 1999, the Court of Justice rulings in the Centros116, 
Uberseering117 and Inspire Art118 cases, concerning the exercise by companies of the 
freedom of establishment guaranteed by Arts. 43 and 48 of the Treaty by means of the 
carrying out of all the business activity through a branch in a Member State different 
from the one in which the company was created for the purpose of benefiting from a 
more liberal company law119, and the transfer of the effective seat in a different 
Member States  while maintaining the legal personality granted by the company law 
of the State of constitution (which latter may have a more liberal regulation), have 
made it clear that the choice of a jurisdiction offering a more favourable regulation 
does not constitute on its own abuse of the right of establishment even if the business 
activity is directed to other EC markets. Member States’ interest to attract companies 
within their jurisdictions, and the consequent “legal competition” for this purpose, 
which – for private limited companies - has been using company law regimes in the 
areas not covered by the notorious EC company law directives, can be expected to 
concern publicly traded companies as well, especially in light of the Shareholders 
Rights Directive. In fact, because this Directive, in facilitating the exercise of 
shareholders’ participation rights, can be seen as an “enabling” Directive, i.e. as a 
Directive fixing minimum standards in this respect but emphasising the importance of 
direct voice mechanisms for the protection of (minority) shareholders through their 
activism, national legislators, in implementing it, are indirectly induced to introduce 
provisions which are even more enabling than the ones indicated by the Directive and 
to use the options granted to them for further facilitating the involvement of national 
and other EC shareholders, who could thus see in the jurisdiction concerned the 
optimal one in which to acquire and/or maintaining (non-controlling) shareholdings. 
The potential legal competition in respect may well result, ultimately, in a market-
driven convergence in formal rules.                
 
3.2….and the need for functional convergence 
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Apart from the fact that the drive towards formal convergence in the areas of 
transparency and disclosure can, in the medium-run, decrease the incentive to 
migration to Anglo-American capital markets and encourage path-dependency, i.e. 
attempts at maintaining ownership structures which have long been characterising the 
corporate panorama of continental Europe jurisdictions, and that a market-driven 
formal convergence in the area of voice mechanisms, if induced by the Shareholders 
Rights Directive, may ultimately make these mechanisms no longer relevant in 
jurisdiction choices by activist minority shareholders, the partial fallacy of a 
comparative assessment based on formal rules has an important consequence. It 
reveals that, beyond disclosure, transparency and, after the implementation of the 
Shareholders Rights Directive, part of the voice mechanisms, formal convergence 
would not be so desirable, as each jurisdiction would need to maintain and to 
strengthen in other areas – such as the regulation of self-dealing transactions which 
may potentially benefit controlling shareholders at the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders - the legal tools for minority shareholders’ protection that are the most 
appropriate in light of the structure and patterns of ownership structure in its own 
reality. This would imply not the same or equivalent formal rules from one 
jurisdiction to another, but rules that – even if different – fulfil the ultimate and 
equivalent purpose: to allow minority shareholders not to be deprived of the expected 
benefits from their investment at the benefit of stronger shareholders.  This would be 
the necessary (type of) functional convergence. The desirable developments can thus 
be described in terms of a ‘moderate’ convergence or an ‘hybridization’: formal 
convergence in areas where the needs correspond from one jurisdiction to another 
irrespective of the ownership structure, such as disclosure and transparency, and to a 
certain extent voice mechanisms designed to avoid or minimise shareholders’ apathy; 
functional convergence in the other areas, where each jurisdiction should adequate, 
over time, its legal tool according to the evolution of ownership structures. This kind 
of overall developments would be in line with the OECD Principles, which, as 
explained by the Methodology, are intended to set objectives and are inspired by a 
functional equivalence in the means to achieve these objectives. The pattern would 
need to be, on the other hand, brought about by the OECD Principles on themselves, 
which – despite their being not-binding recommendations – are intended as a point of 
reference for legislators of all jurisdictions as they reflect what have been perceived as 
concerns perceived by all member countries.            
 
 
4. ……and the seemingly ‘missing dimension’: the protection of  ‘investors’ in 
the broader sense and the objective aspect of (minority) shareholders protection 
 
    The response to the key question – how far the legal mechanisms evidenced by the 
comparative view can go in ensuring the protection of minority shareholders in the 
current global context – can be articulated in two arguments. 
     First, in light of the fact that the encouragement of shareholders’ activism needs to 
be reconciled with the possibility of efficient and effective management by the board, 
it appears that the direct mechanisms offer or are deemed to offer the necessary and 
sufficient tools to minority shareholders for protecting themselves against controlling 
shareholders and/or management, provided these mechanisms can be easily used. This 
applies particularly to “voice”, “monitoring” and “enforcement” mechanisms, which 
by their very nature are complementary to each others in avoiding the extraction of 
benefits by management and controlling shareholders at the expense of minority 
shareholders. The greater the extent to which these mechanisms can be easily used, 
the greater the extent to which they manage - together with the transparency and 
disclosure requirement, with the checks and balances mechanisms and with director’s 
duty of loyalty to all shareholders -  to ensure the objectives indicated by the OECD 
as regards the “subjective aspect” of minority shareholders protection (concerning 
their protection against controlling shareholders and a management which may be 
affected by these stronger shareholders), i.e. the “exercise of the key ownership 
function”  and the “equitable treatment of all shareholders”. Consequently, the partial 
fallacy of a comparative assessment based on formal rules that are in place, rather 
than on the consistency between those rules and the ownership structure in each 
jurisdiction, indicates that the key comparative issue lies in the enforcement 
mechanisms. In view of the functional convergence which is desirable and which is, 
ultimately, required by the OECD Principles, it can be argued that the enforcement  
(which, as it can be deduced from the Methodology, needs to be easily accessible in 
all jurisdictions120) is to be intended as enforcement of rights that need to secure 
minority protection in light of the concentration ownership situation in the specific 
jurisdiction, and that it must be easier the stronger is the ownership concentration and 
the weaker is the effectiveness of checks and balances mechanisms.     
From these viewpoint, an acceptable conclusion at the present stage appears to be 
that, thanks to the combination between more dispersed ownership and easier 
enforcement offered by the class-action mechanisms and lawyers’ contingency fees, 
the US (despite the weaker voice and monitoring mechanisms) have gone further than 
the other jurisdictions in securing the “subjective” aspect of the weaker shareholders 
protection, followed by the UK, whereas France and Germany are moving in the right 
direction in ensuring this aspect, by increasing the enforcement’s accessibility while 
maintaining their stronger voice and monitoring mechanisms.    
    Second, it follows from the above comparative view, and from the convergence in 
disclosure and  transparency requirements and generally of capital market laws, that 
the legislatures in the various jurisdictions have been striving to secure the “subjective 
aspect” of  “weaker” equity investors protection, and that, through the continuing 
efforts first in the US and subsequently also in the EC to ensure transparent and 
efficient capital markets, have also been working towards one of the requirements for 
the “objective aspect” of  (weak) equity investors protection, i.e. towards the aspect 
which, by allowing them to collect “patient capital”, offer one of the conditions for 
businesses’ long-term success. Nonetheless, as previously indicated121, it can be 
inferred that the OECD Principles do indicate another condition for businesses’ long-
term success. This other condition for the “objective aspect” of weak equity investors 
protection can be found – in the Principles – in the “wealth creating co-operation 
between the company and all its stakeholders”, because “the interests of the 
corporation are served by recognising the interests of stakeholders”, which are 
referred to as “resource providers”122. In addition to accepting that the interests of the 
company are served by recognising the interests of stakeholders, the Principles 
recognise the importance of the co-operation amongst all stakeholders’ groups in 
ensuring the sustainability of financially sound enterprises and in the long-term 
success of the corporation. Specifically, it is stated in the Annotations to the 
Principles that corporate governance “..is also concerned with finding ways to 
encourage the various stakeholders in the firm to undertake economically optimal 
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levels of investment in firm-specific human and physical capital” and that “the 
competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of teamwork that 
embodies contributions from a range of different resources providers including 
investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers”123. Arguably, an internationally 
recognised condition for the company’s success lies therefore in stakeholders’ 
commitment to the corporation, by means of “firm-specific investments”. 
Consequently, in addition to the category of equity investors, the concept of 
“investors” in a broader sense needs to include employees, creditors, and suppliers, as 
well as customers, simply because the business’ survival and development over time 
would be at risk without the firm-specific investments of all these stakeholders 
categories. In this regard, it was stressed in the managerial literature that “..the proper 
and unique objective of each company in the society is to maximise the long-run total 
value of the firm. (…) However, firm value is not technically the same as 
shareholders value, because “firm value” also includes the values to all other financial 
claimants such as creditors, debt holders and preferred shareholders (….). Firm value 
will not be maximised, of course, with unhappy customers and employees or with 
poor products. Therefore (….) value-maximising firms will be concerned about 
relations with all their constituencies”124.    
The relations between the corporation and the stakeholders, to be wealth-creating, 
need to be long-term ones and allow the co-operation to develop over time: 
management oriented literature has highlighted that, because stable relationships are 
difficult to build in the current volatile times and in the global markets, these 
relationships – particularly with employees, suppliers, customers, financers etc.. - 
become even more valuable125, so that they become a key asset in the corporations’ 
ability to generate profits over time that can be appreciated ex ante. It has been 
highlighted that shares are, in essence, rights to future incomes126: it follows that the 
higher the company’s ability to generate profits over time that can be appreciated ex 
ante, due to the company’s ability to enter into long-term mutually wealth creative 
relationships with stakeholders which allows it to continue to generate profits over 
time from the core business activity ,  the more effective is “objective aspect” of the 
protection of (weak) shareholders rights to future incomes. This dimension also shows 
that the protection of equity investors, including minority shareholders, is intertwined 
with the protection of stakeholders who need to be induced with the corporation127. 
    It can thus be inferred that the Principles, in addition to formulating objectives in 
terms of “equity investors” protection, acknowledge this importance of the quality of 
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the relations with stakeholders and the need to consider the latter as “stake-investors”, 
whose protection is intertwined with the protection of all equity investors. The 
outcome may appear to be paradoxical: at the same time as, in Germany, the 
jurisdiction which is typically associated with a stakeholder approach due to its 
mandatory labour representation requirement in the supervisory board of major 
companies (co-determination) and in general due to a traditional business culture of 
search for consensus, the mandatory codetermination is being called into question128 
and is subject to strong criticism in part of the Anglo-Saxon literature129 , what 
appears to be suggested by the Principles is exactly that, the more a legal environment 
provides for the protection of stake-investors and encourages the building of long-
term relationships based on mutual trust between the company and all its “resource 
providers”/”stake-investors”,  such as employees, suppliers and customers,  the more 
this legal system can be seen as offering the proper framework for fostering the 
company’s ability to generate profits over time from the ordinary business activity, 
and thus the proper environment for ensuring, ex ante, an essential part of the 
“objective aspect” of (weak) equity investors protection. Nonetheless, what appears to 
be a paradox is not really such, as it is suggested by the fact that the corporate 
objective in itself, as indicated in France, Germany and the UK, always refer, either 
implicitly or expressly, to the relationships with stakeholders and thus the objective 
aspect of (minority) shareholders’ protection. Interestingly, whereas the continuation 
over time and prosperity of the business enterprise (France) and the increase of the 
sustainable value of the enterprise (Germany) refer to this factor implicitly, the 
jurisdiction where the quality of the relationships with stakeholders is expressly 
recognised to be important for the success of the company is the UK, the jurisdiction 
which – like the US - has traditionally been shareholder-oriented. In fact, in the UK 
the new “enlightened shareholders value” concept embodied in the new Companies 
Act admits that, in pursuing the success of the company for the benefit of all 
shareholders, the interests of wider constituencies have to be taken into account130. 
This outcome results from a company law reform which has recognised the 
importance for the company of fostering long-term relationships with both (all) 
shareholders and other constituencies and which, despite its rejection of a stakeholder 
approach, has thus accepted an ‘inclusive’ philosophy of company law, despite the 
UK has consistently been characterised  by an extremely liquid market, regarded as 
unsupportive of long-term investment commitments131. If this development is red 
together with the evolution in Germany, the traditionally more stakeholder-oriented 
jurisdiction, which has witnessed the enlargement of the financial market and the 
development by legislative means of a market for corporate control in a context in 
which hostile takeovers were virtually unknown up to the start of the new millennium, 
it may be argued that each jurisdiction has recognised as important for company’s 
success and thus for the objective aspect of shareholders protection a component 
(liquid financial markets in the case of Germany, the quality of relationships with the 
stakeholders in the case of the UK) that was already well accepted in the other (the 
quality of the relationship in Germany, liquid financial markets in the UK).    
                                                 
128 See, e.g., G.T.Sims, Germany rethinks board structure after corruption scandals, in International 
Herald Tribune, Business, 5 April 2007. 
129 E.Sternberg, Corporate Governance: accountability in the marketplace, 2nd ED, IEA, London, 2004, 
Ch. 5. 
130 Retro, par. 2, 2.2.2. 
131 J.Parkinson, Inclusive Company Law, cit.  
   This, in addition to making the importance of the quality of relations with 
stakeholders even more undisputable for the objective aspect of (minority) 
shareholders protection,  appears to evidence a partly “missing dimension” in the 
literature on shareholders’ protection, which dimension can be noted by considering 
that the new enlightened shareholder value in the UK has been regarded as stating 
expectations of a “socially responsible” business behaviour132. It can be said that this 
is a “partly” rather than a “totally” missing dimension, because the comparison 
between the various jurisdictions concerning the corporate objective, to the extent that 
it reveals whether stakeholders concerns can be incorporated into the decision-making 
by company’s managements, suggests whether and when the protection of stake-
investors is perceived within company law purposes, but it does not address what 
would appear to be the key challenge for legislators: given on the one hand that an 
increasing body of empirical evidence finds a positive correlation between a socially 
responsible behaviour, i.e. between the spontaneous internalisation of stakeholders’ 
concerns in the decision-making beyond minimum legal standards which is known as 
“corporate social responsibility” (CSR), and the long-term success of companies133, 
and this positive correlation has also been stressed by the European Commission in 
specific communications on CSR134, and given, on the other hand, the defects that 
devices such a mandatory codetermination may generate as recently suggested by 
criticism in the case of Germany, this challenge appears to lie in identifying the 
legislative options which, without imposing co-determination or particular kinds of 
relationships, can effectively encourage the building of long-term relationships with 
employees and all other stakeholders as a key to the mutual wealth creation 
cooperation, and thus as a key to the “objective aspect” of (minority) shareholders 
protection.  Because the legal literature focusing on the mechanisms for minority 
shareholders protection against controlling shareholders and managers, and on the 
disclosure requirements offered by securities law,  by choice omits this aspect, the 
elaboration of responses to this challenge which appears to be open for legislators 
could be an apparently difficult, but innovative, task for (legal and interdisciplinary) 
academic research.    
As a further consequence, if one wishes to construct an “investor protection index”, 
intended as minority (non-controlling) shareholders protection index, one should 
neither base the index only on the “subjective aspect”  concerning the formal rules in 
place in one jurisdiction nor assume these rules alone as a base for a comparison with 
other jurisdictions, but should incorporate a twofold dimension in the index: a) the 
“subjective aspect”, which should consist of an assessment of the efficacy of the 
formal (company law and securities law) rules in place in that jurisdiction in 
protecting minority shareholders, in light of the degree of ownership concentration 
and of the efficiency and efficacy of enforcement rules in that jurisdiction; b) the 
“objective aspect”  of (minority) shareholders protection, measured by the ability of 
national provisions in other sectors of law (e.g., employment law, consumer law..) to 
                                                 
132 Some major law firms (Norton Rose, Trevor Smith) have in fact noted, in the enlightened 
shareholder value, a reflection of the UK Government agenda on corporate social responsibility.  
133 J.Solomon, A.Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, cit., p. 14, 28-29 and 192-196  
134 See COM(2001)366, “Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility”; 
COM(2002)347final, “A business contribution to Sustainable Development” and COM(2006)136final 
“Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: making Europe a pole of excellence on corporate 
social responsibility”; COM(2006)136final “Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: making 
Europe a pole of excellence on corporate social responsibility”.  
 
 
encourage the building of long term relationships with employees, with consumers 
and in general with all stakeholders. 
Apparently, the construction of the index, and in particular the weighting up of the 
subjective aspect vs. the objective aspect for each jurisdiction against an overall and 
universally valid measure of “quality” of (minority) shareholders protection (which 
measure could be intended as representative of the OECD Principle,  where both 
aspects can be regarded as existing), would representing the most challenging task for 
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